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Article
Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for
Community Consent Processes in the
Extractive Sector
Lisa J. Laplantet & Suzanne A. Spearstt
An examination of contemporary struggles over extractive industry projects
shows that they are not adequately captured by current CSR strategies
because they are not exclusively disputes about the environment, human
rights or health and safety as those subjects are generally understood by
companies. Rather, they are better understood as disputes over community
control of resources and the right of community members to control the
direction of their lives. This Article proposes that extractive industries can
tackle the underlying causes of the growing opposition to their projects in the
developing world by engaging in consent processes with communities and
groups directly affected by projects with a view to obtaining their free prior
and informed consent (FPIC). The authors propose that FPIC must be
enduring, enforceable, and meaningful in order to take companies and
communities out of their current defensive positions. FPIC should instead
allow companies and communities to take up proactive positions - with those
companies that have the consent of the communities in which they operate
obtaining a competitive advantage and those communities that have
enforceable agreements with companies obtaining control over the natural-
resource-based development process on which their future depends.
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I. INTRODUCTION
These natural resources are ours... If I enter your house, I knock first.
When have they asked our permission to enter a community? ... Never.'
Miguel Palacin, Peruvian Indigenous Leader, Sept. 3, 2007
Why is it that, with many of the large extractive industry companies
having taken up the mantra of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in
recent years, 2 conflicts between such companies and their host
communities are multiplying as never before? Today extractive industry
companies can call upon a range of CSR initiatives, standards and tools to
help them manage community relations responsibly, and many major
companies have codes of conduct in place. Yet barely a day goes by
without news of another multi-billion dollar energy or mining project
being protested, delayed, occupied or otherwise blocked by community
opposition. The number of disputes between foreign investors and host
states is also on the rise and not since the 1980s have we seen as many
government interventions in energy and mining investments as we have
seen in the last two years -many as a result of or accompanied by vigorous
community opposition.
An examination of contemporary struggles over extractive industry
projects illustrates that they are not adequately addressed by current CSR
strategies. Such strategies seek to address only a narrowly circumscribed
range of headline-grabbing issues, such as extractive industry companies'
complicity in human rights abuses by security forces, their involvement in
corruption and their role in fueling armed conflict in diamond-rich
countries. In addition to these important concerns, CSR must also begin to
address the underlying causes of community opposition to extractive
industry projects, which are likely to relate to the rights of communities to
control the natural resources they have long seen as their own and of
community members to control the direction of their lives. In other words,
to overcome conflict, the new generation of CSR techniques must
contribute to sustainable development.
Building on the findings of a number of recent studies,3 this article
1. Interview by Lisa Laplante with Miguel Palacin, Coordinator of the Coordinating Body
of Andean Indigenous Org. (CAOI) and former Chairman of the Nat'l Confederation of
Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI), in Lima, Peru (Sept. 3, 2007).
2. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) addresses the relationship between corporations
and the societies with which they interact. It includes the responsibilities inherent on both
sides of these relationships and calls for corporations to respond not only to shareholders, but
also to other stakeholders interested in their operations.
3. E.g. ENVTL INST. ET AL., PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT AND MINING: PROMOTING THE
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES (2004), available at
http://www.elistore.org/reports detail.asp?ID=10965 [hereinafter ELI ET AL.]; ETHICAL
FUNDS, WINNING THE SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE: RESOURCE EXTRACTION WITH FREE, PRIOR
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proposes that extractive industries can tackle the underlying causes of
opposition to their activities in the developing world by engaging in
consent processes with communities directly affected by their projects with
a view to obtaining their free prior and informed consent (FPIC). In
addition to being free, prior, informed and consensual, FPIC must be
enduring, enforceable and meaningful. Although fraught with
contingencies and in need of considerable further analysis, FPIC presents
the obvious next step in the evolution of the relationship between
extractive industry companies and communities, as it is a model of
stakeholder engagement with the potential to address the complex and
dynamic root causes of community concern.
If implemented properly, FPIC processes should take companies and
communities out of their current defensive positions, in which companies
attempt to manage community-related risks in order to protect their social
licenses to operate, and communities disrupt extractive industry projects in
attempts to protect their ways of life. FPIC processes should allow
companies and communities to take up proactive positions instead;
companies that maintain the consent of the communities in which they
operate will obtain a competitive advantage, while communities that have
enforceable agreements with companies will have more control over the
development processes on which their future depends. If properly
obtained, FPIC should allow large extractive industry projects to go
forward in a less conflicted atmosphere.
Part II of this Article explores why extractive industry projects are
particularly vulnerable to community opposition, and identifies the
triggers for and underlying root causes of that opposition. Part III
examines the emergence of social engagement as an objective of the
extractive industries in the 1990s and the development of second-
generation CSR initiatives since then. Part IV examines the emergence of
sustainable development as an objective of the extractive industries and
introduces the concept of FPIC as a third-generation CSR technique. Part V
presents the principal challenges facing FPIC, including concerns about
sovereignty, the legal status of the concept, and the difficulty of
"operationalizing consent." Part VI illustrates the themes discussed in the
preceding Parts by discussing four case studies of extractive industry
AND INFORMED COMMUNITY CONSENT (2008), available at
https://www.ethicalfunds.com/sitecollectiondocuments/docs/fpic.pdf; MINING, MINERALS
& SUSTAINABLE DEV. PROJECT, BREAKING NEW GROUND - THE MMSD FINAL REPORT (2003),
available at http://www.iied.org/mmsd/finalreport/index.htm [hereinafter MMSD PROJECT];
1 EMIL SALIM, STRIKING A BEITER BALANCE (2003), available at
http://www.commdev.org/files/1955_fileExtractiveIndustriesReview.zip [hereinafter
SALIM 11; 2 EMIL SALIM, STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE (2003), available at
http://www.commdev.org/files/1955_file Extractive_IndustriesReview.zip [hereinafter
SALIM 21; WORLD RESOURCES INST., DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT CONFLICT: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR
COMMUNITY CONSENT 45 (2007), available at http://www.wri.org/publication/development-
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projects in Peru. Finally, we offer some preliminary conclusions about
community consent processes.
II. EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN CONFLICT WITH COMMUNITIES
During the 1980s and 1990s, relatively depressed mineral prices and
the dominant development theories of the time contributed to a trend of
privatization, deregulation and increased openness to foreign direct
investment in the extractive industries of developing economies. 4 As a
result, foreign direct investment in those countries' extractive industries
rose by nine times between 1990 and 2000 and by more than fifty percent
between 2000 and 2005.5 The recent boom in mineral prices, spurred in
large part by the rapid growth in the Chinese and Indian economies, means
that extractive industries are likely to continue expanding into previously
untouched land and coming into contact with new communities in the
developing world in the coming years.
6
Given their prominent role in the mineral production of many
developing countries, transnational corporations inevitably become
associated with the social costs of extraction.7 Few other industry sectors
have such a profound social impact -and consequently such a propensity
to provoke community opposition-as the extractive industries. At the
same time, the sector is particularly vulnerable to disruption by
community opposition and in need of earning and maintaining the trust of
affected communities over time. The following three Parts will explore
why extractive industries find themselves in this conundrum, beginning
with an examination of the vulnerability of the extractive industries to
community opposition, and then examining the triggers for and
underlying root causes of opposition to extractive industry projects.
A. Vulnerability of the Extractive Industries to Community
Opposition
As a preliminary matter, extractive industry projects are particularly
vulnerable to community opposition because they are very long term
(generally lasting at least twenty years), complex (usually involving a chain
of investments, multiple contracts and numerous parties) and capital
intensive (often requiring investments of several billion dollars). Because
4. Extractive industries are those involving the extraction of non-renewable resources,
including energy minerals (oil, gas, coal and uranium), metallic minerals (copper, gold,
bauxite, iron, nickel), industrial minerals (phosphates, salt, gypsum), construction materials
(stone, sand, gravel) and precious stones.
5. U. N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., Div. ON INV., TECH. AND ENTER. DEV., WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 2007: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND
DEVELOPMENT at 102, U.N. Sales No. E.07.1.D.9 (2007) [hereinafter UNCTAD].
6. See UNCTAD Sees Increased FDI in Extractive Industries, REUTERS, Jan. 8, 2008.
7. See Chris Ballard & Glenn Banks, Resource Wars: The Anthropology of Mining, 32 ANN.
REV. ANTHRO. 287, 287-313 (2003).
[Vol. 11
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revenue does not begin to flow until the entire project is complete,
breakdowns or delays in any part of the integrated chain of investments as
a result of blockades, work stoppages, lawsuits, and other forms of
community opposition can negatively affect capital recovery and overall
project internal rate of return.
The financing, construction, and operational risks associated with
extractive industry projects all increase as a result of community
opposition. Financing risks increase because investors and financial
institutions may delay their approval, impose additional conditions or
decide not to finance a controversial project or company.8 Construction
risks increase because delays resulting from community opposition may
raise costs and trigger contractual penalties or finance charges. 9
Operational risks increase because a disrupted project might not be able to
produce a sufficient quantity of output, and may have higher production
costs, reduced access to necessary inputs, and reduced access to markets. 10
Community opposition also might make it more difficult to attract
qualified local workers, require greater expenditure on security and raise
tensions to the point where it becomes unsafe for expatriate management
personnel to reside in the host community."
Conflict with communities also increases reputation and legal risks for
extractive industry companies. 12 Reputation is an extractive industry
company's lifeblood, as it is the key to attracting quality partners, gaining
the opportunity to extract and distinguishing one company from another. 13
Reputations can be tarnished by media reports, NGO investigations,
lawsuits and activist campaigns that bring international attention to the
negative effects of a company's projects in remote parts of the world.
Mounting public relations campaigns, implementing CSR programs to
repair the damage, and defending or settling lawsuits are expensive
endeavors that take up significant managerial time. Lawsuits also often
produce costly settlements and necessitate expensive post-hoc CSR
programs to repair community and public relations.
Finally, companies that make enemies out of the populations affected
by their projects experience higher corporate and political risks. The
disruption or loss of a project may reduce a company's profitability, asset
values and stock price-even for well-diversified companies-due to the
multiplier effects such events can have on a company's reputation. 14
Controversial companies and projects may also be unable to obtain licenses
8. UNCTAD, supra note 5 at 92; WRI, supra note 3, at 13.
9. Int'l Fin. Corp., Managing Environmental, Social and Business Risks,
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/Content/RiskManagement (last visited June 6, 2008)
[hereinafter IFC]; WRI, supra note 3, at 13.
10. WRI, supra note 3, at 13.
11. See id.
12. "Reputation risk is the current and prospective impact on earnings and capital arising
from negative public opinion." Id. at 14.
13. See Steven W. Percy, Environmental Sustainability and Corporate Strategy: Why a Firm's
Chief Environmental Officer Should be its CEO, 7 CORP. ENVTL. STRATEGY 194, 202 (2000).
14. See WRI, supra note 3, at 14-15.
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or other crucial means of support from host- and home-country
governments.15 Aggrieved communities may prompt governments to
bring enforcement actions, impose penalties or tighten regulations.16 In
extreme cases, host-country governments may force companies to
renegotiate the terms of their contracts, refuse to comply with their own
contractual obligations, or even expropriate project assets in response to
community opposition. Similar grievances in different communities may
accumulate to the point where the overall business environment becomes
inhospitable for a given company or industry.
17
B. Potential for Extractive Industry Projects to Trigger Community
Opposition
The feature common to all extractive industry projects that triggers the
most community opposition is the need for delineated areas of land.'8 The
need for land frequently causes property disputes and collides with the
rights of indigenous peoples, who often see their lands as non-saleable and
collectively held, without clearly defined borders or titled owners.19 A
state's use of eminent domain to evict people from their traditional lands to
make way for an extractive industry project can lead to the disruption of
communities and cultures as well as the loss of livelihoods, particularly
when done without adequate compensation.
2°
The sheer physical and economic scale of extractive industry projects
relative to traditional forms of local production also tends to provoke
community opposition.21 Tensions may build as projects compete with
communities for services and scarce resources. 22 Projects often attract an
influx of workers, which may reconfigure local social structures,
relationships and identities; trigger racial and ethnic tensions; threaten
local cultures; and introduce new social pathologies and illnesses.
23
Positive developments, like the creation of jobs and the expansion of
15. See id. at 15.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 150.
19. MARCUS COLCHESTER & FERGUS MACKAY, IN SEARCH OF MIDDLE GROUND: INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION AND THE RIGHT TO FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED
CONSENT 8 (2004).
20. SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 18-19. See also EMILY CARUSO ET AL., EXTRACTING PROMISES:
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND THE WORLD BANK 2 (2003) (quoting
Augustine Hala's remarks concerning a case study in Papua New Guinea: "When you take
our land you cut away the heart of our existence ....").
21. See generally Gavin Hilson & James Haselip, The Environmental and Socioeconomic
Performance of Multinational Mining Companies in the Developing World Economy, MINERALS &
ENERGY, Sept. 2004, at 25, 30 (discussing mining's impact on developing world economies and
societies).
22. UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 150. See also SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing the toll
that extractive industries take on local resources).
23. UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 150; SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 5; Gavin Bridge, Contested
Terrain: Mining and the Environment, 29 ANN. REV. ENV'T & RESOUR. 205, 216-17 (2004).
[Vol. 11
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businesses and development of local infrastructure may vanish once a
project is over.24 The unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of a
project over time may cause rifts in communities and resentment toward
an extractive industry company.25
In addition, extractive activities tend to ignite social conflict because
they make a deeper environmental footprint than other industrial
activities. 26 For example, oil and gas extraction can lead to leakages, spills
and flaring of excess gas while building access roads can led to
deforestation and the disruption of natural habitats -- all of which can lead
to serious environmental damage.27 For its part, metal mining is prone to
contaminating surface and groundwater with toxic wastes, and to causing
deforestation, soil erosion and the spread of mine tailings. 28 The physical
impact of extraction on topography is sometimes irreversible or entails
large clean-up costs that governments or companies refuse to assume.
Indigenous peoples and farmers, who depend on their environment for
subsistence, are particularly vulnerable to environmental damage.29
Communities also resent extractive industry companies that contribute
to or facilitate the corruption endemic in many societies that rely on natural
resources as their main source of income.30 They also fear companies that
commit human rights violations or use private security forces that commit
human rights violations. 31  Local populations may target extractive
industry projects during civil wars and other violent conflicts fueled by
mineral riches.32 Companies that sustain unpopular regimes or that sustain
conflicts by intentionally or unintentionally funding combatants are likely
to provoke the ire of and perhaps become the target of violence for at least
one segment of society.
24. UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 150; SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 5
25. SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 5; Bridge, supra note 23, at 29.
26. The Special Representative of the Secretary General, Interim Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and other Business Enterprises, $ 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) [hereinafter
SRSG].
27. UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 95; SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 5.
28. UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 151; SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 5.
29. SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 5-6. UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 151; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights,
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Report of the Workshop on Indigenous Peoples,
Private Sector Natural Resources, Energy and Mining Companies and Human Rights, 90, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2002/3 (June 17, 2002) [hereinafter ECOSOC, Workshop]; U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, at 2, U.N. Doc. No.
E/CN.4/2003/90 Uan. 21, 2003) [hereinafter ECOSOC, Special Rapporteurl.
30. See Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: Implications of the resource
Curse for CSR Theory and Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 37,45 (2008).
31. Extractive industry companies have been accused of committing or being complicit in
human rights violations more than companies in any other industry. SRSG, supra note 26,
25.
32. Extractive industry companies may become embroiled in civil wars and other violent
conflicts fueled by mineral riches. See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 152; Ballard & Banks, supra
note 7, at 295.
2008]
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C. Underlying Root Causes of Community Opposition to Extractive
Industry Projects
Given the long list of extractive-industry-related grievances, there is an
understandable lack of trust on the part of local communities with respect
to companies and governments in the context of extractive industry
projects. 33 Over the last twenty-five years, indigenous peoples and other
vulnerable communities have learned to express their grievances about the
issues outlined above in the language of human rights and environmental
stewardship 34 and, as will be discussed below, the extractive sector has
begun to respond accordingly. 35 However, as crucial as it is to address
these grievances, they may not actually form the dominant impetus for
local community opposition to extractive industry projects.
Anthropologists find that most local communities are primarily
concerned with "questions of control over their own destinies, both in
relation to the state and in terms of the management of projects, the flow of
benefits, and the limitation or redistribution of mining impacts." 36 This is
consistent with the findings of a study by an extractive industry group, the
International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM). In a survey of thirty-
eight mining-related human rights controversies, the ICMM found that the
main issues dominating headlines concerned adverse health and
environmental impacts in about forty percent of cases, infringements on
indigenous rights in about thirty percent, human rights abuses arising from
security arrangements in about twenty-five percent, company complicity in
civil conflict in about twenty percent, and unfair resettlement in about
twelve percent of cases.37 But complaints regarding companies' failure to
conduct meaningful consultations or obtain community consent for
projects, and about the undesirable economic consequences of these
projects, were even more widespread, underlying nearly fifty percent and
more than sixty percent of community concerns respectively. 38
It is not surprising that the predominant concerns of communities
affected by extractive industry projects in recent years relate to their
inability to control and failure to benefit from such projects. Most of the
33. INTL COUN. ON MINING & METALS, DRAFT POSMON STATEMENT: MINING AND
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' ISSUES (2006) available at
http://www.icmm.com/library-pub_detail.php?rcd=190 [hereinafter ICMM].
34. Ballard & Banks, supra note 7, at 299.
35. See infra Part III.
36. Ballard & Banks, supra note 7, at 298-99. See also Bridge, supra note 23, at 239 (noting
that contemporary struggles over mining are disputes about community sovereignty as well
as the environment).
37. lNTL COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, SECOND SUBMISSION TO THE U.N. SECRETARY-
GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS 22 (2006), available at
http://www.icmm.com/uploads/14691CMM-BHR-2ndsubmissionFINAL.pdf.
38. Id. at 22-23.
[Vol. 11
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projects realized as a result of the 1980s extractive industry expansion are
located near communities that are marginalized geographically,
economically and politically within their countries, and in countries that
are marginalized within the international system. 39 Often they are located
within communities of indigenous people 4O or farmers who have lived in in
the same remote areas for many centuries.41 Compared to the dominant
populations in their own countries and to the people in the countries of
origin of extractive industry companies, the people most affected by
extractive industry operations in the developing world tend to have less
access to justice, formal political processes, decision-making structures,
social services, economic systems and land tenure systems, and they
experience higher rates of poverty, discrimination and prejudice.42
Communities affected by extractive industry projects often feel that,
because of their lack of power, the benefits of extractive industry projects
are channeled toward national centers and the countries of origin of
extractive industry companies (a view that is increasingly shared by
development specialists).43  They also sense than their governments
become even less accountable as extractive industry revenue frees them
from their dependence on other forms of taxation.44 Communities that
have no say in the extractive industry projects that affect their lives, receive
little if any benefit from them, and disproportionately feel the brunt of their
many negative impacts have strong reasons to protest the presence of these
projects in their midst.
The World Bank's three year-long Extractive Industries Review (EIR)
concluded that "[m]any grievances from communities and especially from
indigenous peoples living near extractive industries projects relate to their
claims that their rights to participate in, influence, and share control over
39. Ballard & Banks, supra note 7, at 288.
40. Indigenous peoples are defined as people who, "having a historical continuity with
pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves
distinct from other sectors of societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them."
Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, Study on the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, T 397-82,
U.N. Doc. EC/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 (Sept. 8, 1981) (prepared by Jos6 R. Martinez Cobo).
41. Peruvian farmers do not identify themselves as indigenous peoples, but they too have
long been stigmatized as outsiders. Like indigenous peoples, they see their cultures as unique
and their identities as intimately linked to their lands. See generally ALEJANDRA ALAYZA
MONCLOA, No PERO SI: COMUNIDADES Y MINERIA 20-21 (2007).
42. Jo M. RENDER, INT'L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, MINING AND INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES ISSUES REVIEW 19 (2005). See also SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 7 (describing power
differentials between industrialized and non-industrialized nations and within each country).
43. RENDER, supra note 42, at 19; SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 6-7 (noting that benefits are
generally distributed through central government, which may be extremely corrupt). See
generally RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (R. M. Auty ed., 2001)
(providing information concerning economics and the extractive industries, including the
history of government uses of monetary benefits derived from natural resources).
44. See UNCTAD, supra note 5, at 152. See also Daron Acemoglu et al., Kleptocracy and
Divide-And-Rule: A Theory Of Personal Rule, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N 162 (2004) (discussing the
proclivity of kleptocrats to utilize foreign income from the sale of natural resources to bribe
opponents).
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development initiatives, decisions, and resources are ignored."45 This is
consistent with an earlier study by the World Bank Group called Voices of
the Poor, which found that the poor feel that their voices are not heard and
that they have no control over the events that have the greatest impact on
their lives.46 The report found that impoverished and marginalized people,
particularly women, tend to describe their diminished well-being not in
terms of anxiety about meeting their basic material needs, but in terms of
anxiety about their inability to control their own destinies.47 As Nobel
Prize winning economist Amartya Sen points out in his book Development is
Freedom, human agency is an essential component of developmental well-
being.48 Poor communities are interested in economic benefits from
extractive industry projects, but, more importantly, desire "to receive
visible, tangible forms of recognition from the mining company."4 9
When communities feel excluded from participating in decision-
making processes and have grievances regarding extractive industry
projects, they resort to forms of protests that are detrimental to all
stakeholders. Thus, while extractive industry companies must address the
negative impacts of their own operations, they also must address certain
features of the environments in which they operate- including host
community's feelings of disempowerment and economic distress-if they
are going to avoid community opposition in the future.
III. THE STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT MODEL FOR MANAGING
COMMUNITY OPPOSITION
Faced with growing community opposition as a result of the factors
outlined above, and unprotected by traditional political risk mitigation
techniques, many companies came to see CSR as a branch of risk
management during the 1990s. 50 Whereas the first generation of CSR was
characterized by "charitable philanthropy," this second generation called
for "social engagement."5 ' The addition of local communities to the
"previously binary relationship between states and corporations has led to
the widespread adoption by industry analysts of a three-legged or triad
stakeholder model" of engagement.5 2 It also entailed a "mind-shift away
from confrontation and towards constructive engagement," including on.
45. SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 18.
46. Susan Moller Okin, Poverty, Well-Being, and Gender: What Counts, Who's Heard?, 31
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 280, 307 (2003).
47. Id. at 307-08.
48. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, at xi-xii (1999).
49. Saleem H. Ali & Andrew Singh Grewal, The Ecology and Economy of Indigenous
Resistance, 18 CONTEMP. PAC. 361,387 (2006), quoting Leah Horowitz, Daily, Immediate Conflicts,
73 OCEANIA 35,42 (2002).
50. Mallen Baker, Forward to WILLIAM B. WERTHER, JR. & DAVID CHANDLER, STRATEGIC
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: STAKEHOLDERS IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, at xvi (2006).
51. See Gordon Brown, Socially Responsible Business Behaviour, in INT'L CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, GUIDE TO GLOBAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 16 (2003).
52. Ballard & Banks, supra note 7, at 289.
[Vol. 11
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the part of some NGOs.53
In practical terms, second-generation CSR methods entailed extractive
industry companies consulting with local communities about the social,
economic, and cultural benefits and costs, in addition to the environmental
effects, of their projects. 54 These CSR methods also involved companies
consulting with NGOs and governments and increasingly even with their
competitors to set guidelines for their relationships with the societies in
which they operatess The following two Parts examine the emergence of
social engagement as an objective of the extractive industries and the
development of second-generation CSR initiatives.
A. Emergence of Social Engagement as an Objective of the Extractive
Industries
Two interrelated trends that began during the 1990s led to the focus on
social engagement. First, as globalization heightened the visibility of
extractive industries' operations in the developing world, new non-
traditional, non-state actors began to intrude on areas that were once
considered the preserve of extractive industry management or state
officials.5 6 Consumers, for example, began to demand that extractive
industry companies help solve social problems in addition to making
profits. 5 7 The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Word Bank's
private lending arm, began to require environmental and social impact
assessments for large-scale extractive industry projects as a condition for
financing arrangements. 58 Some NGOs began to partner with business to
address difficult social problems.59 Indigenous peoples started to demand
that extractive industry companies attend to their concerns,60 and activists
forced multinational corporations to focus on reassuring the public about
globalization through a series of protests.61  Suddenly, satisfying the
53. Ralph Hamann, Mining Companies' Role in Sustainable Development, 20 DEV. S. AFR. 237,
239 (2003).
54. Gary McMahon, The Rise of the Community, MINING ENVTL. MGMT, Jan. 1999, available at
http://www.mineralresourcesforum.org/docs/pdfs/communty.pdf.
55. Daniel Franklin, Just Good Business, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, at 3-6 (discussing the rise
of CSR and the involvement of think tanks, consultancies, and governments).
56. Bridge, supra note 23, at 206; Scott Greathead, The Multinational and the 'New
Stakeholder': Examining the Business Case for Human Rights, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 719, 726
(2002).
57. See CONSUMER PROT. IN THE GLOBAL MKT. WORKING GROUP, INT'L ORG. FOR
STANDARDIZATION, THE DESIRABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF ISO CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS 6-7 (2002), available at
http:/ / ec.europa.eu/employment-social/soc-dial/csr/ isoreport.pdf.
58. RAMAMOHAN MAHIDHARA, INT'L FINANCE CORP., THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL
CHALLENGES OF PRIVATE SECTOR PROJECTS: IFC's EXPERIENCE 30 (2002).
59. MCKINSEY & CO., SHAPING THE NEW RULES OF COMPETITION: UN GLOBAL COMPACT
PARTICIPATION MIRROR 24 (1997).
60. ELI ET AL., supra note 3, at 2.
61. Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and 'Soft law' in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 457,468 (2003-2004).
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expectations of a host state was no longer a sufficient means of conducting
business.62 Thus, by the turn of the century, business leaders had started
referring to a company's need to obtain a defacto social license to operate-
from both the local and the international communities-in addition to a de
jure license to operate from host country governments. 63
Second, as a result of a number of well-publicized controversies, the
extractive industry became the face of corporate social responsibility,
particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom.64 In 1995, Royal
Dutch Shell became an environmental and human rights cause c~l~bre in the
United Kingdom in response to its plan to sink a decommissioned oil buoy
in the North Sea and allegations surrounding its complicity in the
execution of Ogoni community leaders in the Niger Delta.65 Shell and a
number of other extractive industry companies became the targets of
ground-breaking litigation in the United States under the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA) focusing on their behavior overseas.66 No corporation has
been found liable in an ATCA case to date, but these lawsuits raised the
very real possibility that extractive industry corporations could be held
internationally responsible for their actions in developing countries. 67
Thus, by the end of the 1990s, many extractive industry companies had
come to see CSR as a branch of "risk management" that could help them
avoid legal risks as well as risks to their reputation.
68
62. Bridge, supra note 23, at 205, 206.
63. This was evident at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1999, where the "Global
Compact" with business was launched by Secretary General Kofi Annan. Press Release,
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on Human
Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic Forum in Davos, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html.
64. Williams, supra note 61, at 467.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 705, 751-61 (2002) (discussing ATCA litigation against
Texaco for alleged environmental harm in Ecuador); Elliot J. Schrage, Judging Corporate
Accountability in the Global Economy, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153, 161-63 (2003-2004)
(discussing ATCA litigation against ExxonMobil for security practices in Indonesia);
Greathead, supra note 56, at 726 (discussing ATCA litigation against Chevron for actions
against protestors in Nigeria and against Freeport-McMoran for human rights and
environmental violations in Indonesia); Bill Baue, To Avoid Risk of Alien Tort Claims Act Cases,
Companies Must Improve Human Rights, SusTAINABILrrY'INv. NEWS, Aug. 17, 2007 (discussing
inter alia ATCA litigation against Drummond for complicity in paramilitary killings of union
members in Colombia), available at http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/2353.html.
67. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Business and Human Rights:
Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, It 27, 30,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007) [hereinafter SRSG 2].
68. Franklin, supra note 55, at 4.
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B. Second-Generation CSR Instruments Available to the Extractive
Industries
These trends led companies and their supporters to begin trying to
manage the risks of community opposition to extractive industry projects
individually and in consultation with others in a number of ways. First,
they started adopting codes of conduct to guide their relationship with the
societies in which they operate, with Shell leading the way in 1997 and BP
following closely behind in 1998.69 Today, almost all of the Fortune Global
500 companies have an explicit set of principles or management practices
regarding the social dimensions of their operations.
70
Second, companies began engaging in multi-stakeholder initiatives to
develop voluntary standards of conduct for the sector in conjunction with
NGOs and governments. 71 In early 2000, for example, the U.S. and U.K.
governments convened a stakeholder dialogue to address human rights
issues inherent in extractive industry operations, which led to the
development of a voluntary set of principles for handling security
arrangements, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
(VPs).72 Extractive industry companies also engaged in a multi-stakeholder
initiative to address the corruption and lack of transparency in many host
countries, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 73 A third
multi-stakeholder dialogue, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
(KPCS), which originated in the efforts to combat the use of "conflict
diamonds" to fund the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Angola, requires that
rough diamonds traded internationally be certified as "conflict free." 74
Third, extractive industry trade associations also started developing
guidelines for their members. The ICMM instituted a Sustainable
Development Framework75 and issued a Draft Position Statement on
Mining and Indigenous Peoples Issues,76 while the International
Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) issued guidelines for social
and environmental impact assessments. 77
69. Michael J. Watts, Righteous Oil? Human Rights, the Oil Complex, and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 30 ANN. REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES 373, 394 (2005).
70. JOHN RUGGIE, HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES OF FORTUNE
GLOBAL 500 FIRMS 3 (2006).
71. John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 102 AM. J.
INT'L. L. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 22), available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_38ruggie.pdf.
72. Williams, supra note 61, at 477. See also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RTS. & LABOR,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2000), available
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/2931.htm.
73. See Genasci & Pray, supra note 30.
74. Kimberley Process Homepage, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com.
75. INT'L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, ICMM SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
FRAMEWORK, ICMM PRINCIPLES (2001), available at
http://www.icmm.com/icmmprinciples.php.
76. ICMM, supra note 33.
77. See INT'L ASS'N OIL & GAS PRODUCERS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSION
(1997), available at http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/265.pdf.
2008]
13
Laplante and Spears: Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
Fourth, the principal financial institutions involved in the sector also
began issuing guidelines. The World Bank Group adopted an Indigenous
Peoples' Policy intended to ensure "that the development process fully
respects the dignity, human rights, economies, and cultures of Indigenous
Peoples." 78 The IFC also established a Policy on Social and Environmental
Sustainability, part of which relates to the treatment of indigenous
peoples.79 In 2006, a coalition of more than forty of the world's largest
private-sector financial institutions -the so-called Equator Principles Banks
(EPBs)- agreed to harmonize their environmental and social policies with
the IFC's.80
Finally, recognizing that "good stakeholder relations are a prerequisite
for good risk management," 81 the World Bank Group also began requiring
project sponsors to engage in "meaningful stakeholder participation"
processes in 1992.82 The World Bank's Legal Department interpreted this
to mean that the communities consulted had a right to reject projects.
83
However, in practice the World Bank has not made obtaining community
consent a prerequisite for companies to obtain funding.84
C. Assessment of Second-Generation CSR Initiatives
The shift towards constructive social engagement and the voluntary
CSR initiatives it produced remains controversial. Critics argue that the
"concept of partnership and stakeholders perpetuates the myth that there
is a collective endeavor, that all players are equal and conflicts of interest
can be resolved by roundtables seeking consensus." 85 Some critics are
skeptical that stakeholder engagement represents genuine recognition of
community concerns as opposed to corporate public relations. 86 They
accuse extractive industry companies of undertaking voluntary CSR
78. WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.10 ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES 1 1 (July 2005), available at
http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf [hereinafter WORLD
BANK MANUAL].
79. INT'L FIN. CORP., POLICY ON SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY (2006),
available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/
polSocEnvSustainability2006/$FILE/SustainabilityPolicy.pdf [hereinafter IFC].
80. See Equator Principles, http://www.equator-principles.com (last visited June 6, 2008).
81. INT'L FIN. CORP., STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT: A GOOD PRACTICE HANDBOOK FOR
COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN EMERGING MARKETS 2 (2007).
82. Robert Goodland, Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank Group, 4
SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y 66, 71 (2004).
83. Id.
84. See id. See generally Fergus MacKay, Indigenous People's Right to Free, Prior and Informed
Consent and the World Bank's Extractive Industries Review, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 43
(2004) (discussing the World Bank's failure to incorporate consent processes into its policy and
practice to date).
85. Asia-Pacific People's Forum, Statement of the Asia-Pacific Peoples' Forum on
Sustainable Development ] 14 (Nov. 25-26, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/jsummit/ major-groups/peoples forum-statementasianprepcom.doc.
86. See Hamann, supra note 53, at 242.
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initiatives merely to avoid being subjected to mandatory regulation with
higher standards and stronger disclosure, monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms.87  By contrast, advocates laud second-generation CSR
initiatives as the new face of "regulation by information" or "soft law" 88
and maintain that the same incentives that led companies to adopt
voluntary initiatives will lead them to adhere to and strengthen them.89
Both critics and proponents must concede that second-generation CSR
initiatives have been largely unable to prevent extractive industry
operations from triggering community opposition. Indeed, instances in
which multi-billion dollar extractive industry projects have been blocked
and even terminated as a result of community opposition have
multiplied.90 In part, that is because second-generation CSR initiatives
were adopted only as risk mitigation strategies. They seek to address only
"flashpoint" or headline-making CSR issues, such as human rights
violations by security forces (the Voluntary Principles), corruption (the
EITI), and armed conflict (the Kimberly Process)-but do not address the
underlying root causes of community opposition to extractive industry
projects, including communities' lack of control over their own destinies
and the natural resources they consider their own.
Consultation as a model of engagement with affected communities
cannot address the underlying root causes of community opposition,
because it "do[es] not involve sharing or transferring decision-making
authority to those who will be directly affected . . . requires only an
exchange of information ... and [is] rarely an empowering form of public
engagement." 91 In practice, plans are presented to communities to "ask for
comments, followed by a decision that incorporates only cosmetic
modifications to the original plan."92 This sort of consultation is incapable
of fostering the sort of broad community support necessary for successful
projects and good risk management.
The continued expansion of extractive industries into new territory,
combined with global population growth, means that more communities
are facing the prospect of hosting extractive industry projects. At the same
time, communities - particularly of indigenous peoples - are growing more
vocal and are gaining increasing recognition of their rights. These
developments promise to lead to a growing number of clashes in the
coming years unless the extractive industries manage to reduce the
negative impacts of their operations and address the underlying causes of
87. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Codes of Conduct: The Fiction of Corporate Self-Regulation,
58 GUILD PRAc. 38 (2001) (criticizing voluntary initiatives).
88. See Williams, supra note 61, at 464; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Governance Networks,
Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041 (2003).
89. INT'L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, SUBMISSION TO U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS: CLARITY AND
CONSENSUS ON LEGITIMATE HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COMPANIES COULD
ACCELERATE PROGRESS 7 (2006) [hereinafter ICMM 2].
90. See infra notes 109-119 and accompanying text.
91. WRI, supra note 3, at 7.
92. Ali & Grewal, supra note 49, at 386.
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community opposition.
IV. THE COMMUNITY CONSENT MODEL FOR OVERCOMING CONFLICT AND
PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Second-generation CSR efforts are largely defensive, meaning that they
are strategies to protect companies against legal and reputation risk.
93
Today, some companies see opportunities for those who lead the industry
by example.94  Third generation CSR is based on the idea that, if
approached strategically, responsible engagement with society creates
value and forms part of a company's competitive advantage.95 Aside from
risk reduction, harmonious relations with a host community will produce
financial benefits, as others will prefer to do business with a company that
has a community's support.96 Harmonious relations will also produce
developmental benefits for host communities 97 -an objective embraced by
many extractive industry companies.
98
There is a long road ahead, but the idea that behaving responsibly
increases profits may well be able to prompt a true transformation in how
businesses behave. 99 Even if companies embraced sustainable development
out of a sense of charitable philanthropy at the outset, they will be required
to make progress on the issue in order to maintain not only their social
license to operate, but also their competitive advantage.10 0 The following
two Parts examine the emergence of sustainable development as a core
strategic issue for the extractive industries and introduce FPIC as a third-
generation model of stakeholder engagement.
93. Franklin, supra note 55, at 4.
94. Id. See also MCKINSEY & Co., supra note 59, at 5 (survey of CEOs shows some see CSR
as an opportunity to gain competitive advantage); David Humphreys, A Business Perspective
on Community Relations in Mining, 26 RESOURCES POL'Y 127, 131 (2000) (Rio Tinto's chief
economist making the case that relations between mining companies and local communities
play a crucial role in the economic and competitive strength of a mine); CHARLES 0. HOLLIDAY
ET AL., WALKING THE TALK: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2002)
(Chairman and CEO of DuPont, Honorary Chairman of the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development, and Chairman of the Committee of Managing Directors, Royal
Dutch/Shell Group of Companies making the business case for CSR); Klaus Schwab, Global
Corporate Citizenship, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2008, at 116-17 (Executive Chair of the World
Economic Forum making the business case for CSR).
95. See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. Bus. REV., Dec. 2006, at 78.
96. Percy, supra note 13, at 202; McKINSEY & CO., supra note 59, at 6, 9.
97. See Brown, supra note 51, at 16 (calling for CSR based on "poverty reduction").
98. See Rio Tinto, Rio Tinto and Sustainable Development (2005),
http://w-ww.riotinto.com/SustainableReview/development/ programmes/default.aspx;
BHP Billiton, Sustainable Development Policy (2005), available at
http://www.bhpbilliton.com/bbContentRepository/docs/SustainableDevelopment/policies
And KeyDocuments/ HSECPolicy.pdf.
99. See Hamann, supra note 53, at 242.
100. See McKINSEY & CO., supra note 59, at 9.
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A. Emergence of Sustainable Development as a Core Strategic Issue
for the Extractive Industries
Two trends combined to make "[d]oing well by doing good . . . a
fashionable mantra" for businesses today. 10' First, financial markets have
created rankings and indices of various kinds to measure and reward the
positive impact of effective CSR strategies on a company's value.102 The
Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes and FTSE4Good, for example, provide
benchmark and tradable indices for socially responsible investors. 103 Many
companies now measure their performance using the "Global Reporting
Initiative" (GRI),1' 4 a sustainability reporting framework designed by the
NGO CERES, and Goldman Sachs now integrates CSR issues into some of
its equity research. 105 By 2007, the investment firms supporting the UN
Global Compact represented nearly eight trillion dollars of global
investments. 0 6 As a result of the "socially responsible investment" (SRI)
trend, one hundred percent of mining companies and sixty-three percent of
oil and gas companies among the Fortune global top 250 companies now
issue social, environmental or sustainability reports in addition to their
financial reports.107 This so-called "triple bottom-line" reporting forces
extractive industry companies to internalize (and try to reduce) the social
and environmental costs of their operations. It reminds them, as the
former Chairman of Shell put it, that "[tihe demands of economics, of the
environment and of contributing to a just society are all important for a
global commercial enterprise to flourish." 108
Second, proliferating news reports of extractive industry companies
engaged in ugly confrontations with host communities and governments
are driving companies to get out ahead of their competitors in making
peace with local communities. 109 Crises facing extractive industry
companies as a result of community opposition over just the past six
months include: planning put on hold in Romania for what would have
become Europe's largest open-pit gold mine due to widespread community
101. Franklin, supra note 55, at 4.
102. McKINSEY & CO., supra note 59, at 23.
103. See Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, http://www.sustainability-indexes.com (last
visited Apr. 22, 2008); FTSE Good,
http://www.ftse.com/ndices/FTSE4GoodlndexSeries/index.jsp.
104. See Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org.
105. GOLDMAN SACHS, GS SUSTAIN (2007), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
docs/summit2007/gs-esg-embargoed-untiO30707pdf.pdf.
106. McKINSEY & CO., supra note 59, at 23.
107. KPMG, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 2002 10
(2002), available at http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/KPMG2002.pdf.
108. Mark Moody-Stuart, The Values of Sustainable Business in the Next Century, Lecture
at St. Paul's Cathedral, London (July 12, 1999), available at
http://www.shell.com/static// media-en/downloads/3983Englishpdf3.pdf.
109. Rebecca Bream, Digging Deep: Mining Faces Up to the Cost of Presenting a Cleaner Image
to the World, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006.
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opposition and court challenges;" 0 South Africans refusing to leave their
ancestral lands to make way for a platinum mine;' Brazilians blockading
an iron-ore mine and major railroad-supply routes;" 2 Ghanaian villagers
winning more than U.S. $ 900,000 from a company to replace their houses,
a church, a mosque and a school destroyed to make way for a gold mine;
113
installation of a tailings pipeline suspended at a nickel project in New
Caledonia following protests from the local community;" 4 the Ardoch and
Shabot Obaadjfwan Algonquin First Nations blocking access to a site in
Canada where a mining company wants to test drill for uranium;" 5 and a
U.S. $ 16 billion environmental lawsuit filed by Ecuadorian indigenous
groups against an oil company. 116 The past few years have also seen
governments pressuring extractive industry companies in response to
community opposition in Canada, 117  Russia," 8  Ecuador, Bolivia,
Venezuela 1 9 and elsewhere. As a result, extractive industry companies
increasingly recognize that, "projects are more likely to be successful over
the long term if they have the broad support of local communities-
including of indigenous peoples-from exploration through to closure." 120
110. See Romania Moves to Block Canadian Gold Mine Project, REUTERS, Dec. 6, 2007, available
at http://u k.reuters.com/article/govemmentFilingsNews/
idUKL0659283320071206; Romanian court deals new blow to Canadian gold mine, REUTERS, Jan. 24,
2008, available at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/rbsslndustryMaterialsUtilitiesNews/idUKL2490031820080124.
111. See Angus Stickler, Who Pays the Price of Platinum, BBC NEWS, Mar. 25, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/file-on-4/7305335.stm; Mining Forces Out
Thousands in SA, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7312018.stm, Mar.
25, 2008.
112. Devon Maylie, Alcoa Invests Near Planned Mines, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2008, at B4.




114. Vale Halts Pipeline Installation at Goro Nickel After Protest, DOW JONES COMMODITIES
SERV., Feb. 25, 2008, available at Dow JONES FACTIVA, Doc. No. DJCS000020080225e42p00003.
115. Mining - North America, MERGENT INDUSTRY REPORTS, Nov. 1, 2007, available at Dow
JONES FACTIVA, Doc. No. MIRAUS0020071228e3b10000b.
116. Kelly Hearn, $16 Billion Environmental Lawsuit Tests Chevron, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 9,2008, at 6.
117. KEMESS NORTH MINE JOINT REVIEW PANEL, KEMESS NORTH COPPER-GOLD MINE
PROJECT (2007), available at http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/050/documents/23469/23469E.pdf
(finding that the proposed mine was not in the public interest).
118. Terry Macalister, Environmentalists Back Putin Over Shell's Energy Permit, GUARDIAN,
Sept. 25, 2006, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/ 2006/sep/25/russia.oilandpetrol.
119. Christian Parenti, Hugo Chavez and Petro Populism, NATION, Apr. 11, 2005, at 15;
Christopher Toothaker, Morales Aligns Himself with Chdvez and Castro, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
3, 2006; Ecuador Cancels an Oil Deal With Occidental Petroleum, REUTERS, May 17, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/17/business/worldbusiness/17oil.html; Marco Aquino,
Strikes, Protests Hit Latin America Mining Boom, REUTERS, Jan. 5, 2007, available at Dow JONES
FACTIVA, Doc. No. LBA000002007010Se315001j4.
120. INT'L COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, THIRD SUBMISSION TO THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHT'S AND
BUSINESS: ICMM SUPPORTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADDITIONAL PRACTICAL MEASURES TO
STRENGTHEN BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS OUTCOMES 12 (2007).
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Whereas in the past companies looked to establish support or trust-"a
precious intangible capital" -through philanthropy, today they are looking
for commercially viable models to compete for it to the benefit of society as
well as their own bottom line.121
B. Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC)
In recent years, indigenous peoples and other vulnerable communities
have begun to demand some form of prior and informed consent to the
extractive industry projects that impact them.122 The passage of the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in September 2007
has strengthened their case, as it recognizes the right of indigenous peoples
to give "their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any
project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly
in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of their
mineral, water or other resources." 12 Like the passage of the Declaration,
general acceptance of the concept of FPIC is long-overdue, as more than ten
years have passed since the organizer of a World Bank-sponsored
conference on mining and the community predicted "that the move from
consultation to participation in decision-making is the next logical (albeit
difficult) step in the evolution of [extractive industry]-community
relations."124
FPIC envisages that local communities are informed about
development projects in a timely manner and given the opportunity to
approve or reject a project prior to the commencement of operations. 125
This includes "participation in setting the terms and conditions that
address the economic, social, and environmental impacts of all phases of
mining and post-mining operations." 126 FPIC differs importantly from
consultation in the way decision-making authority is exercised and
legitimated.127 Whereas consultation processes require only that extractive
industry companies hear the views of those potentially affected by a project
and take them into account when engaging in decision-making processes,
consent processes require that host communities actually participate in
decision-making processes. 28 Consent processes give affected communities
121. McKINSEY & Co., supra note 59, at 26.
122. ELI ET AL., supra note 3, at vii.
123. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295,
32(2), U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007).
124. Gary McMahon ed., Mining and the Community: The Results of the Quito Conference, at x





125. ELI ET AL., supra note 3, at vii.
126. Id.
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the leverage to negotiate mutually acceptable agreements under which
projects may proceed, thereby ensuring that projects stand a better chance
of producing results that benefit them.
129
Proponents agree that FPIC processes will only be empowering,
however, if they meet a number of criteria, particularly the three criteria
that their name implies. First, consent must actually be freely given,
meaning that it must be entirely voluntary and obtained free of coercion,
bribery or manipulation. 130 While a social license to operate may ostensibly
be easier to obtain by bullying vulnerable groups unable to protect
themselves, this will not lead to true community buy-in. Unless explicit
voluntary approval is given, protests may break out once communities
have the confidence to revoke a social license granted under duress.
Second, advocates point out that consent must be obtained prior to a
company receiving legal authorization and financial approval for a
project.'3', Thus, it should also be obtained prior to commencement of any
activities that would affect communities, their lands, territories and
resources. 132 To ensure that all aspects of the project are considered
together and that comprehensive mitigation techniques are designed, the
consent process should be conducted during the initial assessment of
environmental, social and human rights impacts. Project sponsors should
view obtaining community consent as a necessary cost of project
development" and one of the many approvals required to go forward. 133
Third, consent must be fully informed, meaning that affected
communities must know enough about their own rights and the
implementation of the proposed project to be able to negotiate with
equality of information.1 34 They will need information about all stages and
potential impacts of the project and about its revenue in a form that is
understandable and available in local languages. They must also be
allowed sufficient time to review and discuss information provided to
them.
Finally, an effective community consent process must be enduring and
enforceable. Thus, gaining FPIC must not be "a 'one-off' procedure." 135
Rather, it involves "a continuous, iterative process of communication and
negotiation spanning the entire planning and project cycles." 136 Ensuring
that consent is enduring requires both community and independent
129. Id. at 7-8.
130. See MARTA MIRANDA ET AL., FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING: A GUIDE TO
EVOLVING STANDARDS 57 (2005); WRI, supra note 3, at 7.
131. See MIRANDA ET AL., supra note 130.
132. See id.
133. WRI, supra note 3, at 12.
134. See Goodland, supra note 82, at 67; OXFAM AUSTRALIA, FREE PRIOR AND INFORMED
CONSENT: THE ROLE OF MINING COMPANIES 7 (2007), available at
www.oxfam.org.au/campaigns/ miningdocs/FPIC-statement.pdf.
135. OXFAM AUSTRALIA, supra note 134, at 7.
136. WCD, supra note 3, at 281. See also LYLA MEHTA & MARIA STANKOVITCH,
OPERATIONALISATION OF FREE PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT 19 (2001), available at
http://www.dams.org/docs/kbase/contrib/soc209.pdf (discussing the project cycle).
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monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. 137 These should be supported by
independent grievance processes to ensure that community concerns are
addressed throughout a project's lifetime. 3
C. Potential of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
While the concept faces many significant challenges, as will be
discussed in further detail below, FPIC processes have the potential to heal
relations between extractive industry companies and communities. If
implemented properly, these processes should begin to address both of the
most prevalent underlying root causes of community grievances against
extractive industry projects- failure to obtain consent and negative
economic impacts or insufficient economic benefits.
Effective FPIC processes should address the claims of many people
living near extractive industry projects that their rights to participate in,
influence, and share control over development decisions are ignored. As
the World Resources Institute points out, consent processes should
"empower host communities by changing the basic terms of engagement,
and can thereby help ensure that the poorest and most marginalized or
disenfranchised groups are included in the decision making." 139 Well-
implemented FPIC processes should also constitute the sort of visible,
tangible forms of recognition from extractive industry companies that
many affected communities expressly desire. But to be effective, FPIC
cannot be merely symbolic: "Participation must . . . improve project
performance."'1
40
Meaningful participation in decision-making should also address
community concerns about negative economic impacts of projects and
ensure that they receive an equitable share of project benefits.' 41 Although
extractive industries are inherently unsustainable, insofar as they involve
consumption of nonrenewable natural resources, they "could be
considered sustainable if [they] improve[] the welfare of future generations
by, for example, raising other forms of capital, such as human capital (if
revenues are used, say, for education) or social capital." 142  Local
participation should also help counter the lack of good governance at the
national level that often prevents the extractive sector from becoming an
137. WRI, supra note 3, at 49.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 8.
140. Mac Darrow & Amparo Tomas, Power, Capture, and Conflict: A Call for Human Rights
Accountability in Development Cooperation, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 485, 505 (2005).
141. See Ballard & Banks, supra note 7, at 303. See also Convention Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 169 I.L.O. 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382
(entered into force Sept. 5, 1991), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/62.htm [hereinafter ILO Convention]; Declaration
on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, Annex, art. 2(3), U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128
(Dec. 4, 1986), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm.
142. SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 3-4.
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"engine for poverty alleviation."1 4 3 It can also enable local communities to
define the concept of poverty alleviation, which is particularly important
for indigenous people for whom wealth may mean not only the
accumulation of money, but also the preservation and development of their
unique ways of life. 44
Moreover, participation in decision-making should address the most
common triggers of community opposition. It is known to help protect
and is a core tenet of a number of specific human rights, including the right
of self-determination, 145 the right to meaningful participation in
environmental decision making, 146 and the right for communities to control
access to their lands and resources. 47 Participation in decision-making is
also recognized as a core tenet of the rights of indigenous peoples' 48 and as
an important mechanism for operationalizing the human-rights based
approach to development. 49 Its recognition would enable communities to
guide extractive company behavior away from committing or being
complicit in human rights violations.150 By addressing both the triggers
and the underlying root causes of community opposition, FPIC should
accomplish many of the risk management objectives of CSR's second
generation as well as the competitive objectives of CSR's third generation.
FPIC means recognizing the right of communities to reject extractive
industry projects and a corresponding acceptance by extractive industry
companies that they may have to walk away from projects, even when in
"possession of full, state-sanctioned rights of access and extraction." 15
This may seem a lot to ask of companies, but, in an age when extractive
industry companies are seeing their projects effectively vetoed around the
world after they have already sunk large unrecoverable costs into them, the
risk of rejection prior to development should seem a relatively small price
to pay in exchange for a peaceful process in the event that the project does
go forward. Moreover, communities are more likely to accept a project if
143. SALIM 2, supra note 3, at 2.
144. SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 4 (2003).
145. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
146. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 June 13,1992).
147. See Moiwana Cmty. v. Suriname, Case 11.821, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 26/00,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. at 278 (1999), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ seriec-124_ing.pdf.
148. See U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 123, art. 18.
149. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report of the
International Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous
Peoples, 1 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2005/3 (Feb. 17, 2005).
150. Participatory models, which espouse values similar to FPIC, are often included in
overall guidelines for good governance. See, e.g., AUSAID, GOOD GOVERNANCE: GUIDING
PRINCIPLES FOR IMPLEMENTAnON 1, 3 (2000), available at http://www.ausaid.gov.au.
151. Bridge, supra note 23, at 250.
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they have participated in decision-making throughout the project cycle. 52
FPIC processes also give communities the ability to withhold their consent
in a peaceful manner if their concerns are not addressed, eliminating the
need to resort to violence, blockades and other disruptive forms of protest.
While the business and development case for FPIC is sound, there is no
question that the adoption of FPIC by extractive industry companies would
represent a truly historic shift in the relationship between companies and
communities.
V. CHALLENGES FACING COMMUNITY CONSENT PROCESSES
A number of extractive industry associations, initiatives and
companies have endorsed FPIC.5 3 However, a number of other extractive
industry participants continue to resist the principle. The Extractive
Industries Review, a multi-year review of the extractive industries
commissioned by the World Bank, endorsed the principle;15 4 but the
governors of the World Bank ultimately refused to do so.l'5 Instead of
adopting FPIC, they mandated that an extractive industry project must
secure the "broad support" of affected communities through a process of
"free, prior, and informed consultation" in order to be eligible for Bank
financing.1 56 Following a comprehensive review of its own environmental
and social policies, the IFC also adopted the broad community support
standard, 15 7 and the Equator Principles Banks (EPBs) followed suit.158 In its
2006 Draft Position Statement on Mining and Indigenous Peoples Issues,
the ICMM stated that its members "may . . . seek consent for [their]
152. See WCD, supra note 3, at 7. See also Ali & Grewal, supra note 49, at 385-86 (explaining
that the willingness of developers to change siting decisions based on indigenous concerns
helps build trust and mutual respect).
153. These include the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation
Association (IPIECA) and the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP). See
IPIECA/OGP, KEY QUESTIONS IN MANAGING SOCIAL ISSUES IN OIL AND GAS PROJECTS 5 (2002),
available at
http://www.ipieca.org/activities/social/downloads/publications/key-questions.pdf
(noting that "it is important for communities to be able to give free and informed consent").
The ICMM has endorsed FPIC in its Draft Position Statement on Mining and Indigenous
Peoples Issues. ICMM, supra note 33 (identifying "seeking consent" as a possible way to
implement Commitment 5). A number of specific companies, including Rio Tinto and Anglo
American, have committed to FPIC in their corporate policies. ANGLO AMERICAN, TOWARDS
SUSTAINABLE MINING (2002), available at http://www.eupolitix.com/NR/rdonlyres/
3940BD43-2C2C-44AF-AE699A71DEFBC4E/0/sdreport.pdf; Rio TINTO, HUMAN RIGHTS
GUIDANCE: GUIDANCE FOR MANAGERS ON IMPLEMENTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 2 (2003),
available at www.riotinto.com/ documents/ ReportsPublications/corpPubHumanRights.pdf.
154. SALIM 1, supra note 3, at 18-19.
155. WORLD BANK GROUP MANAGEMENT, STRIKING A BETrER BALANCE: WORLD BANK
GROUP MANAGEMENT RESPONSE 7 (2004) [hereinafter MANAGEMENT RESPONSE].
156. Id. (emphasis added). They also revised the Bank's indigenous peoples policy to
apply the same broad community support standard. WORLD BANK MANUAL, supra note 78, at
1.
157. INI'L FINANCE CORP., GUIDANCE NOTES TO PERFORMANCE STANDARD 7,152 (2007).
158. See The Equator Principles, supra note 80.
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activities" as part of a process of gaining and maintaining broad
community support.5 9 It remains to been seen whether the final position
statement, due to be released this year, will go further to require FPIC in all
instances, retain the text as drafted, or retreat from this principle.
Extractive industry companies and their financial institutions appear to
have three principal concerns with the concept of FPIC: that it is a direct
challenge to sovereignty, that it is not well enshrined in law, and that it is
difficult to operationalize. Each of these valid concerns, which are
recognized to varying degrees even by FPIC's proponents, will be treated
briefly in turn below.
A. Concerns About Sovereignty
Some extractive industry companies argue that FPIC is a direct
challenge to national sovereignty. 160 Those who argue for full government
control over the permit process claim that FPIC would allow communities
an effective veto over projects that would be beneficial to the broader
development goals of the nation.161 They note that, "[tlhere are actually
very few developed countries in which central government does not have
• . . an ultimate say" and ask, "should different standards apply in the
developing world?" 162 Implementing FPIC would, they say, lead to a
reduction in foreign direct investment in extractive industries, thereby
eliminating development opportunities for resource-rich but otherwise
poor countries.
163
Meanwhile, NGOs who argue in favor of FPIC for local communities
point out that the concept is an internationally recognized human right,
particularly for indigenous peoples, and that, as such, it cannot be
overridden by state sovereignty or the collective rights of a nation to
economic development. 164 They argue that the failure to obtain FPIC in
violation of human rights would be "contrary to state responsibility under
international law." 165 They ask why extractive industry "companies and
governments should be allowed to veto indigenous peoples' human
rights."'1
66
Striking a balance between the rights of local communities to control
their lives and lands, and the rights and responsibilities of central
governments to pursue national development goals is a challenge for all
governments. 167  Given the revenue extractive industry projects can
159. ICMM, supra note 33, at 2 (emphasis added).
160. See RENDER, supra note 42, at 30.
161. ICMM 1, supra note 89, at 7. See also, MANAGEMENT RESPONSE, supra note 155, at v
(emphasizing that consultation "does not mean a veto power for individuals or any group").
162. Id.
163. Id. at 6.
164. OXFAM AUSTRALIA, supra note 134, at 9.
165. Id.
166. MacKay, supra note 84, at 47.
167. ELI Er AL., supra note 3, at 3.
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generate, some governments undertake this balancing act in only the most
perfunctory manner with the outcome in favor of the extractive industry
project all but a foregone conclusion. By requiring companies,
governments and affected communities to actively engage with one
another, to seek a mutually acceptable approach to extractive industry
projects, and to abandon projects when no such approach can be identified,
adherence to the principle of FPIC would help ensure that governments
take their obligations to all of their citizens seriously. Moreover, projects
formulated with community input are more likely to benefit local
communities and to be accepted by them, thereby benefiting companies
and host nations.168
B. Concerns About Legal Status
Some extractive industry companies and their financial institutions are
also hesitant to adopt the principle of FPIC because they maintain that
there is a lack of international consensus regarding the principle169 and,
"with very few exceptions, it is not enshrined in local legislation." 70 As a
preliminary matter, an international consensus on the obligatory nature (if
not the precise content) of the principle of FPIC is emerging as evidenced
by the inclusion of the right to FPIC in the text of several human rights
instruments and through the jurisprudence of a number of international
human righ ts bodies.
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for example,
while not a binding instrument, constitutes recognition of indigenous
peoples' right to FPIC by most members of the international community.'71
International Labor Organization Convention No. 169 also requires that
states "establish or maintain procedures through which [they] shall consult
[indigenous] peoples" to determine if their "interests would be
prejudiced" 172 by extractive industry projects, "with the objective of
achieving agreement or consent."173
Although the right to FPIC is more clearly recognized with respect to
indigenous peoples, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
168. See David Baluarte, Balancing Indigenous Rights and a State's Right to Develop in Latin
America: The Inter-American Rights Regime and ILO Convention 169, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL'Y 9 (2004) (arguing that ILO Convention 169 and Inter-American human rights
jurisprudence endorse FPIC as the key to balancing indigenous and state development rights);
MacKay, supra note 84, at 47 (arguing that project sponsors cannot expect to gain the "broad
community acceptance" that the World Bank and other financiers now require if communities
believe that their opinions will not be respected).
169. See Caruso et al., supra note 20, at 18.
170. ICMM, supra note 37, at 8.
171. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 123, at 5-6, 8. See
also Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Committee on Juridical
and Political Affairs, OEA/Ser.K/XVI (May 22, 2007), available at
http://www.oas.org/consejo/cajp/Indigenous%20documents.asp.
172. ILO Convention, supra note 141, art. 15(2).
173. Id. art. 6(2).
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Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights provide for self-determination and free pursuit of development by
all peoples. 74 Accordingly, some argue that all communities should have a
meaningful role in making decisions about projects that affect them. 7 As
noted by the WRI,
For non-indigenous communities, the case for FPIC is based on (1)
the right to meaningful participation in environmental decision
making; (2) the right to control access to their lands and resources;
(3) contemporary standards of public participation as a hallmark of
legitimate governance; and (4) basic principles of equity and
justice.
7 6
UN treaty bodies have also recognized the right to FPIC. The Human
Rights Committee, for example, has "stress[ed] the obligation of the State
party to seek the informed consent of indigenous peoples before adopting
decisions affecting them."' 77 Observing that indigenous peoples have and
continue to suffer from discrimination, and "in particular that they have
lost their land and resources to colonists, commercial companies and State
enterprises," the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
has called upon states to "ensure that no decisions directly relating to their
rights and interests are taken without their informed consent." 178 Further,
the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights has noted "with
regret that the traditional lands of indigenous peoples have been reduced
or occupied, without their consent, by timber, mining and oil
companies." 179 It then recommended that the State party "consult and seek
the consent of the indigenous peoples concerned." 180
Like the U.N. human rights treaty bodies, the Inter-American human
rights bodies have consistently held that indigenous peoples' informed
consent is required in relation to activities that affect their traditional
territories. 181 The Commission has observed that Inter-American human
rights law requires "special measures to ensure recognition of the
particular and collective interest that indigenous people have in the
174. ICCPR, supra note 145, art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, U.N.T.S. 3.
175. WRI, supra note 3, at 9-10.
176. Id. at 10.
177. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations of.the Human Rights Committee: Canada,
22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5 (Apr. 20, 2006).
178. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXIII
(51) Concerning Indigenous Peoples, 3 A.I.L.R. 142, 143 (Mar. 1998).
179. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts., Concluding Observations of the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Colombia, 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.74 (Nov. 10,
2001).
180. Id. 33.
181. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples Participatory Rights in Relation to Natural Resource
Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights Indigenous Peoples have in Lands and
Resources, 22 ARI. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7 (2005).
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occupation and use of their traditional lands and resources and their right
not to be deprived of this interest except with fully informed consent,
under conditions of equality, and with fair compensation." 182 In a number
of cases involving extractive industry or forestry projects, the Court held
that states violated indigenous peoples' human rights by failing to obtain
their consent in relation to land concessions, 183 land delimitation,
demarcation and titling, l8 4 and the provision of compensation or
alternative lands.18 5
A number of countries have also incorporated community consent
provisions in domestic law. 186 Yet, even where they have not incorporated
the principle into domestic legislation, states are obligated to give domestic
legal effect to applicable human rights guarantees under both customary
international law and the human rights conventions to which they are
parties. 187 States also have affirmative obligations to prevent and respond
to human rights violations committed by private persons, including
multinational extractive industry companies. 18  While states hold the
primary obligations under international law, extractive industry conduct
that contravenes human rights norms at a minimum triggers the "state's
duty to actively intervene and protect victims. 89
C. Concerns About "Operationalizing" Consent Processes
Finally, extractive industry companies and NGOs alike point to the
challenges of operationalizing FPIC, including determining what
constitutes "consent," who represents the affected "community" and how
historically marginalized communities can engage "meaningfully" with
182. See, e.g., Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, Doc. 46 4 131 (2002).
183. The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
66 (Feb. 1, 2000), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/66-ing.html.
184. Moiwana v. Suriname, Case 11.821 44 209-211.
185. Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
125 (June 17, 2005).
186. See WRI, supra note 3, at 8-9 (discussing the Philippines, the United States, Australia
and Russia); MacKay supra note 84, at 60 (discussing Ecuador and Colombia).
187. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 145, art. 2; International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 2, Dec. 21, 1965, 60 U.N.T.S. 195; American
Convention on Human Rights arts. 1,2, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. See
also, inter alia, U.N. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 31 on
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/Rev.1/Add.13 (May
24, 2004) [hereinafter HRC General Comment 31].
188. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988). See
also HRC General Comment 31, supra note 187.
189. SRSG 2, supra note 67, 4 10-18 (discussing the state duty to protect). See also Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Report to Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/8session/reports.htm (discussing the
state duty to protect, the corporate responsibility to respect and access to remedies).
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extractive industry companies. None of these questions has an easy
answer and this is the area most in need of extensive future study,
although a number of important contributions have already been made by
a handful of academics and NGOs.19°
First, an effective FPIC process will require careful analysis of what
constitutes consent. According to a paper prepared for the World
Commission on Dams by the University of Sussex, consent may take
various forms, "such as a report from a community task force . . . a
community referendum or a community meeting."191 It also pointed out
that, "[m]ost indigenous peoples also have their own customary
mechanisms for arriving at a consensus within the community." 192 Others
have argued that consent must take the form of binding, negotiated and
enforceable formal legal agreements.1 93
While consent should be consensual -meaning that there is
harmonious agreement with the measures designed to make the proposed
project acceptable-it does not need to constitute absolute consensus-
meaning that a majority may be sufficient and a single person should not
be permitted to veto a project. 94 Consent requires that a community has
discussed important issues together with their leaders and with the project
sponsor until they have determined that, on balance, they will benefit from
the project and are satisfied that mechanisms are in place to address any
problems that arise.
Second, obtaining consent from communities is often complicated by
the difficulty of determining who comprises the relevant community and
who speaks for that community. Communities are far from homogeneous
and may be divided about whether to support an extractive industry
project.195 The ICMM observes that "resolving disputes and deciding how
to treat groups that may be impacted to differing degrees" poses a serious
challenge to FPIC processes.
196
The consent process should allow communities, indigenous peoples in
particular, to participate through their own freely chosen representatives
and customary or other institutions.197 Indigenous peoples may have
special status and rights under international law, but all interested
190. See generally MEHTA & STANKOVITCH, supra note 136. See also VIVIANE WEITZNER,
NORTH-SOUTH INST., THROUGH INDIGENOUS EYES: TOWARD APPROPRIATE DECISION-MAKING
PRocEssEs REGARDING MINING ON OR NEAR ANCESTRAL LANDS (2002), available at
http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdf/synenfinal.pdf; GAIL WHITEMAN & KATY MAMEN,
NORTH-SOUTH INST., MEANINGFUL CONSULTATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE MINING SECTOR
(2002) available at https://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/handle/123456789/35236.
191. MEHTA & STANKOVITCH, supra note 136, at 19.
192. Id.
193. WRI, supra note 3, at 49.
194. OXFAM AUSTRALIA, supra note 134, at 7.
203. Id.; ALAYZA MONCLOA, supra note 41, at 14; Colin Filer & Martha Macintryre, Grass
roots and Deep Holes: Community Responses to Mining in Melanesia, 18 CONTEMP. PAC. 215 (2006).
196. ICMM, supra note 37, at 8.
197. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report of the
International Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous
Peoples, 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2005/3 (Feb. 17, 2005).
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community members should be allowed and encouraged to take part in the
FPIC process, including stakeholders affected by indirect or cumulative
impacts.198 A number of advocates stress that "[o]pportunity to participate
in decisions about development should . . . not further marginalise
individuals or groups that may traditionally be denied social power due to
gender, ethnicity, religion, class or caste." 199 Consent processes must be
inclusive if they are to help prevent future conflict, meaning that the entire
community must have the opportunity to be heard, to have their questions
answered, and to give their consent freely.
Third, perhaps the greatest challenge facing FPIC processes is ensuring
that communities possess "a genuine capacity to influence the economic
and political agendas" surrounding an extractive industry project.200 This
will require the building of social capital- meaning a set of norms that will
be shared between and among the extractive industry company and the
affected community. 201 Such norms may be very difficult to construct if
there is already a legacy of distrust between the community and the
extractive industry company or if resentment against the state is displaced
onto extractive industry companies, as is often the case in developing
countries where the state is effectively absent from the regions in which
extraction occurs.202 In such situations, communities may pursue their own
interests directly with the extractive industry companies. Companies that,
like the state, find their claims to mineral rights disrespected and contested
if they fail to provide tools for sustainable development, may try to meet a
community's development demands or pressure the government into
doing so in an effort to build confidence and trust with the community.20 3
For communities to engage meaningfully in consent processes, they
may also need education about their rights, training to ensure that they can
advocate for themselves, or assistance from civil society organizations. 20 4
Building "adequate channels and organizational capacities for participation
can be an expensive and time-consuming exercise." 205 Yet capacity building
is a worthwhile exercise. Unless communities have the capacity to
negotiate an adequate share of project benefits and to express their
grievances effectively through the FPIC process, they will revert to
damaging protests. The World Bank Group has concluded that the
"extractive industries can contribute to sustainable development, when
projects are implemented well and preserve the rights of affected people,
and if the benefits they generate are well-used." 206 This requires effective
198. MIRANDA ET AL., supra note 130, at 47.
199. OXFAM AUSTRALIA, supra note 134, at 9.
200. Darrow & Tomas, supra note 140, at 507.
201. See Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and Development, 22 SAIS REV. 3, 23 (2002).
202. Ballard & Banks, supra note 7, at 296.
203. Id. at 292.
204. See Jonathan Rosenberg & Linus Spencer Thomas, Participating or Just Talking?, 5
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 61, 65 (2005) (discussing United Nations Environmental Programme's
capacity-building programs).
205. Darrow & Tomas, supra note 140, at 510.
206. MANAGEMENT RESPONSE, supra note 155, at iii.
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guidance from the affected peoples themselves.
VI. THE PERUVIAN EXPERIENCE
After leading a bloodless self-coup in 1992 that gave him almost
limitless executive power, President Alberto Fujimori abruptly liberalized
the Peruvian economy and welcomed foreign direct investment (FDI) into
the country's languishing extractive sector.207 He also wrote a new
constitution, which asserts that "renewable and nonrenewable natural
resources are property of the Nation and it is within the State's sovereignty
to decide their use," 208 and created a framework of laws for investment
growth and protection, which provides that "all companies have the right
to organize and develop their activities in the form they judge
necessary." 2°9 In response to these and other enticements, FDI began
flooding into Peru's extractive sector, particularly the mining industry.
210
Today, Peru is among the top ten countries in terms of FDI in the extractive
sector and is host to some of the world's largest extractive industry
companies. 211 It is the world's second largest copper and zinc producer, the
fifth-largest gold producer and the leading silver producer,212 and is
"widely seen as having the biggest mining potential in South America." 213
The mining industry has committed to investing over U.S. $ 11 billion in
Peru between 2007 and 2011.214
207. See Carol Wise, The Politics of Peruvian Economic Reform, 36 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. &
WORLD AFF. 75,75 (1994).
208. Constituci6n Politica del PerOi art. 66 (translated by Lisa Laplante).
209. Ley Marco para el Crecimiento de la Inversion Privada, Legis. Decree No. 757, art.9
(1991) (Peru) (translated by Lisa Laplante).
210. See PERU SUPPORT GROUP, MINING AND DEVELOPMENT IN PERU 5 (2007), available at
http://www.perusupportgroup.org.uk/pdfs/Mining%20and %20Development %20in%20Per
u.pdf (noting that mining accounted for fifty-five percent of all exports in Peru in 2005 and for
thirty-seven percent of FDI in Peru between 2001 and 2003). Subsequent administrations have
continued with Fujimori's liberal policies. See John Crabtree, Alan Garcia's second coming, OPEN
DEMOCRACY, July 28, 2006, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-
protest/garcia second_3773.jsp.
211. ALAYZA MONCLOA, supra note 41, at 13. See Director del FMI resalta progreso que
experimenta la economia Peruana [FMI Director Emphasizes Peruvian Economy's Progress], LA
REPOBLICA ONLINE (Peru), Sept. 21, 2007,
http:/ /www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com-contentant/ taskview/ id,179252/ It
emid,0.
212. Peru's Copper, Zinc, Gold Output Grew in February, REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2008, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/rbsslndustryMaterialsUtilitiesNews/idUSN30340638200803
30.
213. Hal Weitzman, Roof Caves in for Mining Groups in Peru, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2006,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/05e645a4-388d-11db-ae2c-0000779e2340.html.
214. See Josk de Echave, Entre la convenci6n de Arequipa y Majaz [Between the Arequipa and
Majaz Conventions], LA REP0BLICA ONLINE (Peru), Sept. 16, 2007,
http:/ / www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com-contentant/ task,view/ id,178198/ It
emid,0/; Mineria espera inversiones por 11.600 millones d6lares hasta 2011 [Mining Industry
Expects Investments of U.S. $11.6 Million Until 20111, LA REPUBLICA ONLINE (Peru), Sept. 11,
2007,
30
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The growth in investment in extractive industries has been
accompanied by "an equally remarkable surge in social mobilization and
conflict around mining." 215 By 2007, the Peruvian Defensoria del Pueblo
(Ombudsman's Office) was recording thirty-five separate ongoing conflicts
related to mining 216 and an average of thirty reported incidents of conflict
per month.217 The Ombudsman found that communities, companies, and
the State were using violence, their positions were growing more polarized
and communities were mobilizing. 218 The result was "confrontations
resulting in lives lost, grave injuries, destruction of private and public
property and paralyzed investment." 219
Ironically, the increased social unrest associated with the investment
boom in the extractive industries has undermined the efforts by the
government to improve the investment climate in Peru.220 Since Fujimori's
reforms, companies have seen their operations disrupted, their property
destroyed, their stock prices plummet, their expansions blocked and their
state licenses rescinded. They have also lost time, money and productivity
as a result of community opposition. 221 The five mining conflicts discussed
below -Yanachocha, Tambogrande, Majaz, Antamina and Tintaya-are
but a few of the countless protests reported in the press in the post-reform
period.m
The erosion of support for foreign investment in the extractive sector
occurred relatively rapidly, with sixty-two percent of the population
supporting the privatization process in 1992 and only twenty-nine percent
supporting it in 1999.3 This suggests that the majority of the Peruvian
population welcomed foreign extractive industry companies in theory and
that opposition has stemmed from the way privatization has been
http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com-contentant/task,view/id,177452/It
emid,0/.
215. PERU SUPPORT GROUP, supra note 210, at 6.
216. Defensoria del Pueblo reporta que el 2008 inicia con 78 conflictos sociales [Ombudsman's




217. Interview by Lisa Laplante with Miguel Levano, Staff Member of Social Conflict Unit,
Peruvian Ombudsman, Lima, Peru (Aug. 25, 2007) (transcript on file with author).
218. DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO, Los CONFLICTOS SOCIOAMBIENTALES POR ACTIVIDADES
EXTRAcTIVAS EN EL PERU [Socio-environmental Conflicts Caused by Extractive Activities in
Peru] 4 (2007), available at http://www.defensoria.gob.pe/inform-extraordinarios.php.
219. Id. (translation by author).
220. HEIKE MAINHARDT-GIBBS, THE WORLD BANK EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW § 3.9
(2003), available at assets.panda.org/downloads/eirsalsummarydec03.doc (last visited Apr. 21,
2008).
221. See, e.g., Aquino, supra note 119; Halting the Rush Against Gold, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3,
2005; Revolt in the Andes, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2007; Hal Weitzman, Mining Groups Struggle to
Operate in Peru, FIN. TIMES, June 3, 2005; Weitzman, supra note 213.
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implemented and companies have behaved in practice.24 The following
two Parts will explore why extractive industries are the focus of so much
social conflict in Peru and then examine five examples of mine-community
conflicts in the country.
A. Causes of Conflict Between Extractive Industry Companies and
Communities in Peru
There are many explanations of the post-reform conflicts between
extractive industry companies and communities in Peru, 225 but three stand
out as the most significant. First, a legacy of environmental damage for
which few have assumed responsibility coupled with recent expansion into
more environmentally sensitive areas has helped turn much of the
population against the extractive sector.226 Although the Fujimori-era
investment growth and protection law mandates observance of
environmental standards227 and the country's Environmental and Natural
Resource Code requires companies to submit an environmental impact
assessment that is subject to public review and comment before a project
can proceed, 228 Peru has no environmental ministry to monitor compliance.
Instead, the Ministry of Energy and Mines handles the environmental
portfolio. As a result of the conflict of interest inherent in ministries
responsible for economic expansion and foreign investment also managing
environmental issues, projects are rarely, if ever, rejected on the basis of a
potential negative environmental impact.229 Thus, among the principal
demands of communities affected by mining is the creation of an
environment ministry and increased environmental monitoring and
regulation.
230
Second, many Peruvian communities have come to resent extractive
industry projects because they have enjoyed relatively few developmental
224. Id. See also Clotilde Gouley, Conflictos mineros, interculturalidad y politicas pfblicas
[Mining Conflicts, Interculturality and Public Policy], 65 ECONOMIA Y SOCIEDAD 46, 50 (2007)
(noting that mining communities were among those who initially welcomed the development
of the sector but became disillusioned).
225. DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO, supra note 218, at 5-6.
226. Id. See MAINHARDT-GIBBS, supra note 220, § 3.8; PERU SUPPORT GROUP, supra note 210,
at 4; WORLD BANK, WEALTH AND SUSTAINABILITY (2005), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPERUINSPANISH/Resources/TheEnvironmentalan
dSocialDimensionsoftheMiningSectorinPeru.pdf.
227. Ley Marco, supra note 209, art.9.
228. C6digo del Medio Ambiente y Los Recursos Naturales [Environmental and Natural
Resources Code], Legislative Decree No. 613 (1991) (public hearings required through
Ministry resolution No 335-96-EM/SE (1996)).
229. MAINHARDT-GIBBS, supra note 220, at 46. See also Jos6 Carlos Reyes, Nuevo ministerio
debefiscalizar mineria [New Ministry Must Fiscalize Mining], LA REPOBLICA ONLINE (Peru), Jan.
11, 2008, http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com-contentant/task,view/
id,198479/ltemid,0.
230. Revolt in the Andes, supra note 221; Milagros Salazar, Activists Accuse Prime Minister of
Siding with Mining Firm, INTER PRESS SERV., Oct. 31, 2007.
[Vol. 11
32
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 11 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol11/iss1/6
2008] Out of the Conflict Zone 101
benefits from them, while bearing the brunt of their costs.23' The extractive
industry boom has taken place largely in remote mountains and rainforest,
among the country's poorest and most marginalized communities,
including indigenous peoples and subsistence farmers. 232  Fujimori's
reforms weakened the rights of these communities while strengthening
investors' land rights and facilitating their access to resources, 233 resulting
in some communities losing their ancestral lands and livelihoods without
adequate compensation. 234 Fujimori's reforms also eliminated all royalty
payments from the mining industry and lowered the tax rate so
substantially that, despite having one of the strongest economies, Peru had
among the lowest levels of tax revenue and social expenditure in Latin
America during the 1990s. 235 So little tax revenue returned to local
governments 236 and so few local jobs were created 237 that host communities
remained as poor in 2000 as they had been before the extractive industry
boom.238 Not surprisingly, disappointed communities concluded that,
"nothing [good] arrives for the people" as a result of extractive industry
projects. 239 Some Peruvian economists are also disappointed with the
economic impact of FDI in the extractive industries and urge the
government to rein in labor subcontracting, impose a windfall tax,240 or
eject foreign companies from the sector all together.241  Development
specialists concur that, to overcome social conflict, Peru needs to do a
better job of orienting extractive industry revenue towards sustainable
development.
242
231. DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO, supra note 218, at 5-6.
232. ALAYZA MONCLOA, supra note 41, at 28.
233. The reforms did not address conflicting land classification schemes, causing industry
rights to overlap with indigenous reserves and protected areas where mining previously had
not been permitted. MAINHARDT-GIBBS, supra note 220, § 4.2. Law No. 26570 also modified
Article 7 to include the concept of servidumbre (or easements). See ALAYZA MONCLOA, supra
note 41, at 129.
234. Monte Reel, In Chile, Precious Lands Often Go for a Pittance, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2006,
at A2 (discussing the Andean region).
235. MAINHARDT-GIBBS, supra note 220, § 2.4 (noting that tax revenue was approximately
twelve percent of GDP in 2000).
236. Id. § 3.7, § 4.2 (noting that about twelve percent was required by law to be returned,
but it usually was not). See also Weitzman, supra note 213.
237. Extractive industry projects in Peru have generated relatively few jobs and rarely use
local contractors. Revolt in the Andes, supra note 221.
238. Seventy-two percent of the rural population was poor and forty percent was
extremely poor in 2005. WORLD BANK, PERU OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL: PERU POVERTY
ASSESSMENT, Report No. 29825-PE (2005), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/ IB/2006/05/11/00001200
9_20060511144754/ Rendered/PDF/298251PErevOpdf.pdf.
239. Interview by Lisa Laplante with Miguel Palacin, Coordinator of the Coordinating
Body of Andean Indigenous Org. (CAOI) and former Chairman of the Nat'l Confederation of
Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI), in Lima, Peru (Sept. 3, 2007).
240. See Revolt in the Andes, supra note 221.
241. Pasada la consulta [Consultation Passed], LA REPUBLICA ONLINE (Peru), Sept. 17, 2007,
http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com-contentant/taskview/id,178332/ It
emid,0.
242. MAINHARDT-GIBBS, supra note 220.
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Finally, local communities in Peru have resorted to disruptive protests
against extractive industry projects because they have no other outlet for
their grievances.243 Peruvian investment law provides that "to dispose of,
encumber, lease or exercise any other act on communal lands in the
mountains or rainforest requires approval by at least two-thirds of the
community members of the local general assembly." 244 However, the
principle of free, prior informed consent generally has not been adhered to
in practice. 245 Indeed, in 2006, the Vice-Minister of Mines and Energy
implied that Peru's law and its policy do not coincide when he argued that
communities do not have the right to veto mining activities. 246 Increasingly
aware that they do in fact have that right under both international and
domestic law, but lack a domestic forum in which to exercise it,
communities affected by the extractive industries often "end up seeing
protest, even violent protest, as their only means of expression." 247 Thus,
according to Peru's Ombudsman's Office, better mechanisms for citizen
participation and capacity-building are key to stemming the tide of social
conflict. 248 As a result of these three factors and prompted by some specific
conflicts, including those over Yanacocha and Tambogrande, 249
communities affected by mining united under the banner of the National
Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining
(CONACAMI) in 1999 to coordinate their advocacy efforts and campaign
at the national level.250 One of CONACAMI's demands is that the
government enforce communities' right to give their free, prior and
informed consent (or to reject) extractive industry projects.251 Another
objective of the network is to support communities that reject extractive
industry projects in their struggles to prevent them. 25 2 Under the banner of
CONACAMI, communities have employed a variety of protest tactics,
including "political action, mass mobilization and civil disobedience." 253 In
2002, in the context of the Tambogrande and Majaz conflicts, they also
started organizing local referendums. 254
By late 2002, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) were warning that social conflict related to the extractive
243. See Aquino, supra note 119.
244. Ley de la Inversion Privada, Law No. 26505, art.11, July 10, 1995 (translation by
author).
245. See ALAYZA MONCLOA, supra note 41, at 37.
246. PERU SUPPORT GROUP, supra note 210, at 7.
247. Interview with Miguel Levano, supra note 217.
248. DEFENSORiA DEL PUEBLO, supra note 218, at 11.
249. See infra at Parts VI.B.1 and VI.B.2.
250. Jeffrey Bury, Livelihoods, Mining and Peasant Protests in the Peruvian Andes, 1 J. LATIN
AMER. GEOGRAPHY 1, 4 (2002).
251. Interview with Miguel Palacin, supra note 239.
252. Interview by Lisa Laplante with Luis Vittor, Technical Advisor to the Coordinadora
Andina de Organizaciones Indigenas (CAOI) (Andean Coordinator of Indigenous
Organizations), Lima, Peru (Aug. 28, 2007).
253. WRI, supra note 3, at 45.
254. See infra at Part VI.B.2.
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industries was beginning to dominate the political landscape in Peru. 255 By
2005, in the wake of a number of high-profile conflicts, including that over
Cerro Quilish and Tintaya, 256 a nationwide "anti-mining sentiment" had
spread across the country. 257 That year, anti-mining protests placed at least
U.S. $ 1.1 billion of existing investments at risk and jeopardized planned
investments of U.S. $ 3 billion.25 They also kept radical nationalist Ollanta
Humala ahead in the presidential polls for several months as he pledged to
revise contracts and impose a windfall tax on foreign investors. 25 9
Today some communities accuse the victor of the election, the more
moderate nationalist Alan Garcia, of siding with foreign companies
because his administration has negotiated a "voluntary contribution" to
social programs, rather than imposing a windfall tax, 26° has empowered
public security forces to use greater force against mining protesters, 261 and
has presented a draft law to Congress declaring twenty mining projects "in
the national interest," including some that have been rejected by local
communities. 262 The perception of bias caused communities to be skeptical
when the government finally began trying to facilitate dialogue and the
peaceful resolution of community-company conflict.263 Thus, although
some progress is being made by individual companies, including
Antamina and Tintaya,264 the atmosphere in the country remains hostile
toward new and expanded mining investments.
265
B. Examples of Extractive Industries in Conflict with Communities
1. Anti-Mining Sentiment at Yanachocha
One of the world's largest and most profitable gold mines, Yanacocha
produces almost half of Peru's gold.2 66 It is a lynchpin asset for each of its
two principal owners, U.S. Newmont Mining Corporation and the
255. WORLD BANK & INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, RESTORING FISCAL DISCIPLINE
FOR POVERTY REDUCTION IN PERU 166 (2002).
256. Id. at 46.
257. See de Echave, supra note 214.
258. Protests Endanger $1 Bin Mine Investment in Peru, REUTERS, Aug. 4, 2005.
259. Weitzman, supra note 213.
260. Revolt in the Andes, supra note 221 (citing the recommended contribution as three
percent of a company's after-tax profits); Weitzman, supra note 213.
261. See Wilfredo Ardito Vega, Semejanzas y diferencias entre Garcia y Toledo [Similarities
and Differences Between Garcia and Toledo], INSIGNIA ONLINE, July 2007, available at
http://www.lainsignia.org/2007/julio/ibe_021.htm (suggesting a return to the repressive
methods of the Fujimori years).
262. Salazar, supra note 230.
263. See id.
264. See infra at Parts V.B.3 and V.B.4.
265. See Unions Call for National Strike as More Workers Down Tools in Peru, REUTERS, Sept.
20, 2007, available at
http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/view/ mineweb/en/page504?oid=37106&sn=Detail.
266. DEFENSORfA DEL PUEBLO, INFORME DEFENSORIAL No. 62, at 11 (2001), available at
http://www.defensoria.gob.pe/inform-defensoriales.php (last visited April 4, 2008).
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Peruvian Compaftia de Minas Buenaventura, and it is the IFC's largest
investment in the mining sector.267  Yanacocha's owners reportedly
invested U.S $ 405 million in the project.268 The mine, which is expected to
be productive for the next thirty to fifty years, closed in 2007 with 14.2
million equity ounces of gold reserves. 269 If gold prices were to stay at the
all time high reached in March 2008 of one thousand dollars an ounce,
270
Yanachocha's reserves would be worth U.S. $ 14.2 billion.
When Yanachocha broke ground in 1992, inhabitants of the nearby city
of Cajamarca welcomed the prospect of new jobs and improved living
conditions. 27' However, the mine's rapid and unexpected growth, heavy
use and pollution of local water supplies, and growing workforce
comprised mainly of outsiders soon provoked significant community
opposition. 272 In 1999, approximately 6,000 people blockaded the mine's
headquarters, voicing opposition to its expansion. The protesters
expressed concerns about the mining company's unilateral decision-
making style and hoarding of the riches extracted from the community's
backyard, as well as its failure to bring in promised development.
273
In 2000, an accidental mercury spill and the mine's slow response
triggered even more serious community opposition and brought the
problems at Yanacocha to the attention of a wider audience.274 When a
company truck spilled 330 pounds of liquid mercury onto the main street
of the village of Choropampa, many villagers took the small silver balls
home. A week later, more than a thousand began to suffer acute mercury
poisoning. As the villagers struggled to overcome the health and
environmental effects of the spill, NGOs helped them try to hold the
company accountable for its negligence in Peruvian courts, 275 and
filmmakers made an award-winning documentary about their ordeal. 2
76
Tensions mounted even further a few years later when the Yanacocha
mining company attempted to explore a 3.7 million ounce deposit of gold
called Cerro Quilish over the vigorous opposition of the people of
Cajamarca, for whom the land was sacred and a primary source of water.
277
267. WRI, supra note 3, at 40.
268. MAINHARDT-GIBBS, supra note 220, at 27 tbl.3.6.
269. Newmont Mining Corp NEM (NYSE), REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2008, available at
http://stocks.us.reuters.com/stocks/fullDescription.asp?rpc=66&symbol=NEM.
270. U.S. Gold Hits $1,000 Record High, REUTERS, Mar. 13, 2008, available at
http://biz.yahoo.com/rb/080313/markets-gold.htm.
271. WRI, supra note 3, at 41.
272. Id. at 42.
273. Bury, supra note 250, at 10. For a general discussion of conflicts surrounding
Yanacocha, see Jane Perlez & Lowell Bergman, Tangled Strands in Fight Over Peru Gold Mine,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at Al.
274. Perlez & Bergman, supra note 273, at A12-A13.
275. See Ven caso de derrame de mercurio [Mercury Spill Case Heard], LA REPUBLICA ONLINE
(Peru), Dec. 19, 2007,
http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/optioncomcontentant/task,view/id,
276. TAMBOGRANDE: MANGOS, MURDER, MINING (Guarango Film & Video, 2007).
277. Carla Salazar, Peru Mine Closed by Farmer Protests, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 26, 2006,
available at http:/ / www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=2786.
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The company managed to overturn a city ordinance declaring Cerro
Quilish protected from mining at the Supreme Court, and moved drilling
equipment into the area in 2004.278 In response, the community blocked the
road to the mine and mobilized approximately 10,000 people in the city-
center.
The indefinite delay in the development of Cerro Quilish dealt a
serious blow to the company and its owners. Assuming a continued gold
price of U.S. $ 1,000 per ounce, Cerro Quilish's reserves are worth U.S. $ 3.7
billion and their exploitation would have helped offset the decline
occurring elsewhere on the company's concession. 279 The loss of Cerro
Quilish contributed to a thirty percent decline in Yanacocha's overall
production over two years, as well as a quarterly drop in profits for
Newmont, the mine's majority owner.28 0 The IFC tried to sell its stake in
the mine, but "found a cool reception." 281 The controversy over Cerro
Quilish became the subject of a 2005 New York Times article and an episode
of the PBS television program "Frontline World," which highlighted the
many problems of the Yanacocha mine for an international audience.282
The mine continued to court controversy as it began laying plans the
following year to replace the production loss from Cerro Quilish by using
"cyanide and large amounts of water to extract gold from ore" in another
gold pit called Carachugo. 283 The residents of Cajamarca once again held a
series of protests, pointing to studies showing that the proposed method
would endanger their water and food supplies, and culminating in a week-
long blockade of the access road to the mine.284 The blockade, which cost
the mining company U.S. $ 1.8 million per day,285 ended when the
government agreed to monitor the area's water quality and the mine
agreed to construct water purification plants. 286
The controversy over Carachugo may have been a tipping point for
Yanacocha. In April 2007, Newmont's board supported a shareholder
resolution requiring the company to investigate and report on the impact
of the mine's operations on local communities to the 2008 annual
278. Minas Conga S.R.L. y Otros, Tribunal Constitucional de Perl, 300-2002-AA/TC
(2003),available at http://www.tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2003/00300-2002-AA%2000301-
2002-AA%2000302-AA.html.
279. See Perlez & Bergman, supra note 273 (discussing decline in company's concession).
280. Dorothy Kosich, Yanacocha's 2Q Gold Production Decline Shocks Analysts Despite
Warnings, GOLD NEWS, July 31, 2007, available at
http://www.mineweb.co.za/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page34?oid=24290&sn=Detail;
Steve James, Energy, Miner Shortage Hurt Newmont Profit, REUTERS, Oct. 26, 2005.
281. Robert Kozak, World Bank's IFC See Continued Role in Peru's Yanacocha, Dow JONES,
Nov. 10, 2006.
282. Perlez & Bergman, supra note 273, at A12.
283. Protests Shut Down Production at Gold Mine in Peru, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 29, 2006,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/29/yourmoney/mine.php.
284. Id.
285. Newmont Gold Mine in Peru Reaches Agreement in Pollution Dispute, AFP, Sept. 4, 2006,
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-kmafp/is_200609/ai_n16925990.
286. Leslie Josephs, Peru Brokers Accord Between Villagers, Yanacocha Gold Mine,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 4, 2006.
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meeting.287 Yanacocha recently became the first major mining project in
Peru to receive ISO 14001 environmental management certification for its
operations, 288 indicating that it is making an effort to address one of the
major issues that has triggered community opposition to its operations. 28 9
The mine is still experiencing periodic blockades, 290 however, indicating
that it has yet to successfully address other causes of community
opposition. Further progress at Yanacocha would be good news, not only
for the communities and the companies directly affected, but for the
mining industry in Peru generally. The most prominent leader of
community opposition to the mine predicts that, "[i]f Yanacocha does
things better, it will open the doors to all mining projects in the North of
Peru. If it doesn't, it will close the door to these projects."
291
2. Referenda at Tambogrande and Rio Blanco
In 1997, Manhattan Minerals, a Canadian company, won a concession
to explore the copper, zinc, silver, and gold deposits that sit directly
beneath the town of Tambogrande in the northern region of Cajamarca.
Building a mine would require the relocation of half of the town's
population, approximately 9,000 people. The project also required digging
an open pit next to the Piura River, a vital source of water to the farming
communities of Cajamarca, which had used irrigation to turn an arid desert
into a lush orchard of limes, mangos and other fruits, making it Peru's
largest fruit exporting region.292 Manhattan Minerals, which anticipated
that the project would require a U.S. $ 405 million investment, expected to
find a senior partner and be operating by 2004.293
Manhattan Minerals proceeded with its exploration without consulting
surrounding communities, leading to a sustained period of conflict
between 1998 and 2003.294 At first the protests were infused with humor,
287. Steve James, Newmont Backs Socially Conscious Shareholder Move, REUTERS, Apr. 23,
2007, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSN2026303220070423.
288. Press Release, Newmont, Yanacocha receives ISO 14001 certification for mine in Peru
(Apr. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page674?oid=50250&sn=Detail
289. See generally Weitzman, supra note 221 (noting that even Yanacocha's opponents
concede it has improved environmental standards).
290. See Press Release, Yanacocha, Sobre El Ilegal Bloqueo Que Contima En
Huambocancha Alta (On the Illegal Blockade that Continues in Huambocancha Alta) (April 4,
2008), available at http://www.yanacocha.com.pe/index.asp.
291. WRI, supra note 3, at 44.
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with marchers descending on the capital, Lima, dressed as limes and
carrying signs reading "Ceviche en Peligro! Sin lim6n no hay ceviche"
("Ceviche in danger! Without lime there is no ceviche"). 295 But eventually
a rally outside Manhattan's barracks turned violent, ending in the burning
of several buildings and followed by the murder of the main leader of the
opposition to the proposed mine.296 With a new leader urging the town to
choose peaceful resistance, residents next took their protest to the ballot
box, holding a referendum on June 2, 2002 in which 120,000 community
members voted and ninety-eight percent rejected Manhattan Mineral's
plans. 2
97
The central government denied the legality of the vote; but, as a result
of the referendum and a sustained follow-up campaign by NGOs,
Manhattan Minerals could not find a senior partner for the venture or meet
the terms of the option to develop the site that it had received from the
Peruvian government.298 It decided to abandon its plan for the mine, its
only project at the time, and subsequently renounced all intention of
investing in Peru ever again.299 The loss of the project apparently cost
Manhattan Minerals U.S. $ 60 million.3°°
The Tambogrande precedent has influenced the posture of other
Peruvian communities, including those affected by the proposed Rio
Blanco Project in the northern region of Piura. 301 In 2003, the United
Kingdom's Monterrico Metals acquired the rights to develop the Rio
Blanco Project, thought to contain the largest deposits of copper anywhere
in the world.3 2 The company planned to develop the mine through its
Peruvian subsidiary, Minera Majaz, at a cost of about U.S. $ 1.4 billion.30 3
The project's expected lifespan is twenty years with annual exports of one
billion dollars a year.3°4
Relations with surrounding communities got off to a bad start when
Minera Majaz was accused of having only community leaders sign
documents that were required by law to be authorized by two-thirds of the
tambograndeReportEng.html.
295. Corinna Zeltsman, Choropampa: The Price of Gold/Tambogrande: Mangos, Murder,
Mining, N. Am. Congress on Latin Am. Rep. on the Am., July-Aug. 2007.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. WRI, supra note 3, at 45.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Stephanie Boyd, Tambogrande Referendum Has Domino Effect in Peru (July 16,
2002), http://americas.irc-online.org/citizen-action/focus/0207tambogrande.html.
302. PERU SUPPORT GROUP, supra note 210, at v; Rio Blanco, Nuestra Empresa [Our
Company], http://www.rioblanco.com.pe/detailspage.asp?idcategoria=l&idpagina=l (last
visited Apr. 21, 2008).
303. Rio Blanco, Estudio de factibilidad [Feasibility Study],
http://www.rioblanco.com.pe/detailspage.asp?idcategoria=2&idpagina=7 (last visited Apr.
21, 2008); Oxfam America, Rio Blanco: History of a Mismatch in Peru (Sept. 14, 2007),
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/whatwedo/where-we-work/south..america/news-publicat
ions/ rio-blanco-history-of-a-mismatch-in-peru.
304. Oxfam America, supra note 303.
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community, and then claiming it had acquired the necessary community
assembly vote to obtain its license.30 5 According to a leader of the affected
communities, when the population complained about the company having
"entered our lands without authorization ... the problems and threats
began."306 Farmers and environmental groups also warn that Piura's cloud
forests and alpine plateaus, which are home to endangered species and the
source of rivers that support farming communities in valleys below, are an
inappropriate location for an open pit operation using cyanide like that
planned by Minera Majaz.
30 7
The resulting conflict between the community and the proposed mine
has led to prolonged blockades of access roads, violence, and deaths, and
the arrest of hundreds of local farmers and community leaders.308 It has
also led the Peruvian Ombudsman to lodge a complaint with the Minister
of Energy and Mines and to community protests against Monterrico Metals
in front of the London Stock Exchange.30 The protests also caused such a
significant drop in Minera Majaz's share price that China's Zijin
Consortium was able to take control of the company from Monterrico
Metals in April 2007.310 After years of frustrated attempts at dialogue, local
communities decided to follow the example of Tambogrande and hold a
referendum with the support of the local government. On September 16,
2007, almost sixty percent of the 31,000 voters in affected districts cast their
vote, with ninety percent voting against the mining project.311 One voter
explained, "[it] cannot be that a company invades us without respecting
the laws of the community." 312 The referendum gained national and
international attention, attracting Peruvian Congress members, as well as
305. Frank Garcia & Julio Talledo, Minera Majaz debe solicitar nuevos permisos a comunidades
[Majaz Mining Company Should Request New Permits from Communities], LA REPOBLICA
ONLINE (Peru), Sept. 28, 2007,
http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com_contentant/task,view/id,180547/It
emid,O.
306. Milagros Salazar, Qui vamos a dialogar si Majaz invadi6 nuestras tierras y quiere
encarcelarnos [Why Should We Have a Dialogue When Majaz Invaded Our Lands and Wants
to Imprison Us?], LA REPUBLICA ONLINE (Peru), Sept. 9, 2007,
http://www.larepublica.com.pe/content/view/177009/593.
307. Anti-mining Demonstrators Blockade Peruvian Roads, ENV'T NEWS SERV., May 7, 2007
[hereinafter Demonstrators Blockade Roads].
308. Milagros Salazar, iLa lucha de los bdrbaros? [Fight of the Barbarians?], LA REPUBLICA
ONLINE (Peru), Sept. 12, 2007,
http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,comcontentant/task,view/id,177457/It
emid,0/. See also Demonstrators Blockade Roads, supra note 307 (describing the blockades of
major roads in Piura).
309. Demonstrators Blockade Roads, supra note 307; Simon Goodley, Business Diary: Copper
protesters turn to street theatre, TELEGRAPH ONLINE, Apr. 6, 2007,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/ main.jhtml?xml=/money/2007/04/05/ccdiaryO5.xml.
310. Goodley, supra note 309; Rio Blanco Copper S.A., Historia del proyecto [History of
the Project], http://www.rioblanco.com.pe/detailspage.asp?idcategoria=2&idpagina=9.
311. Revolt in the Andes, supra note 221..
312. Milagros Salazar & Javier Cobefias, Abrumador 'NO' a la mineria [Overwhelming 'No'
to Mining], LA REPOBLICA ONLINE (Peru), Sept. 17, 2007,
http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com-contentant/task,view/id,178429/It
emid,0 (last visited March 25, 2008).
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international observers. 313  The National Elections Jury call the vote
illegal,31 4 while the President and Prime Minister rejected the community
initiative as "anti-mining" and "anti-development" and claimed its
organizers were "communists." 315
Despite the initial attitude of the executive branch, the referendum
turned the tide in the communities' favor. A week after the vote, the
Congressional Commission on Energy and Mines facilitated a meeting
among company representatives, community leaders and mayors of towns
near the proposed project,316 and on October 12, 2007, the executive branch
temporarily suspended the project pending the approval of an additional
environmental impact study.317 Since then, Minera Majaz has undertaken a
costly CSR campaign in an attempt to dispel fears about the project and
gain permission to go ahead with the mine. 318 It hopes that work on the
mine will begin sometime in 2008, but currently the future of the project is
uncertain.
31 9
3. Consultation at Antamina
Antamina is the world's third largest mine, Peru's leading producer of
zinc and the second largest copper and molybdenum mine in Peru.320 The
U.S. $ 2.2 billion construction program was one of the largest new mine
development projects ever undertaken. 321 With the price of copper
313. Consulta fue transparente [Consultation Was Transparent], LA REPUBLICA ONLINE
(Peru), Sept. 21, 2007, http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com-contentant/
task,view/id,179137/Itemid,0.
314. Liliana Rojas, 30 mil comuneros se pronunciardn sobre la actividad minera en consulta vecinal
[Thirty Thousand Community Members Will Discuss Mining Activity in Village Meeting], LA
REPUBLICA ONLINE (Peru), Sept. 2, 2007,
http://www.larepublica.com.pe/content/view/175704/483/.
315. Del Castillo: "No se pueden exigir obras y estar en contra de inversiones" [Del Castillo:
"One Can't Demand Public Works and be Against Investment"], LA REPUBLICA ONLINE
(Peru), Sept. 14, 2007,
http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com-contentant/task,view/id,177935/It
emid,0; Presidente Garcia pide "no sobrevalorar" consulta de Majaz [President Garcia
Recommends "Not Overvaluing" Majaz Consultation], LA REP0JBLICA ONLINE (Peru), Sept 16,
2007, http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com contentant/ task,view/
id,178287/Itemid,0.
316. Congreso invitard a directivos de minera Majaz para conciliar posiciones [Congress Will
Invite Minera Majaz Officials to Reach Compromise], LA REPUBLICA ONLINE (Peru), Sept. 19,
2007, http:// www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,comcontentant/ task,view/
id,178845/Itemid,0.
317. Mesa de didlogo por caso Majaz se instala hoy con todos sus actores fMajaz Roundtable
Opens Today with All Parties], LA REPUJBLICA ONLINE (Peru), Oct. 29, 2007,
http:/ / www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com-contentant/ task,view/ id,185888/ It
emid,0.
318. Rio Blanco Copper S.A., Politicas de Responsabilidad Social [Social Responsibility
Policies], http://www.rioblanco.com.pe/detailspage.asp?idcategoria=l&idpagina=3.
319. Revolt in the Andes, supra note 221.
320. See Compatiia Minera Antamina S.A., Nuestra Empresa [Our Company],
http://www.antamina.com/01_antamina/En-empresa.html [hereinafter Nuestra Empresa].
321. Antamina Mine Site,
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hovering around U.S. $ 8,645 per ton and the price of zinc at U.S. $ 2,405
per ton in March 2008,322 Antamina's annual production of 675 million
pounds of cooper and 625 million pounds of zinc323 is worth U.S. $ 3.2
billion per year. Three Canadian mining companies sponsored the project,
which is now owned by Xstrata, BHP Billiton Plc., Teck-Cominco Limited
and Mitsubishi Corporation.
324
Exploration of Antamina began in 1998 in the province of Huari, one of
the poorest in Peru.325 At the time, eighty four percent of the residents were
farmers or raised animals, seventy percent of the population was
malnourished, and the majority of homes lacked basic necessities, such as
potable water, electricity and proper drainage. 326 Most residents spoke
only Quechua, the local indigenous language, and few held legal title to
land, as they had always lived communally.
327
Antamina should have been a success story according to second-
generation conceptions of CSR. The mine consulted the host community
from the outset, holding public hearings to evaluate its Environmental
Impact Study and forming discussion roundtables. 328 It formulated a
Community Development Plan and established a Foundation to invest in
the community with projects in health and education, agriculture, herding,
tourism, and cultural development.329 Antamina's relocation plan was
based on World Bank standards, 330 and it integrated the ICMM's principles
into its code of conduct.331 The company stated that its goal was "to be a
facilitator, a strategic partner that provides the necessary tools so that these
communities are able to achieve their own development and improve their
quality of life."
332
Yet, despite all these efforts, Antamina soon began to confront distrust
and discontent on the part of local communities. Some attribute the
company's troubles to its failure to uphold the agreements it made in the
exploration phase of the project and to the fact that the office charged with
http://www.infomine.com/minesite/minesite.asp?site=antamina.
322. Metals Copper Turns Lower on Profit Taking Close to All-Time High, THOMSON FIN.
NEws, Apr. 7, 2008, http://www.fxstreet.com/news/forex-news/article.aspx?
StoryId=66eca858-cdeb-4330-9505-ea445dc83669.
323. Antamina Mine Site, supra note 321.
324. Nuestra Empresa, supra note 320.
325. Cynthia A. Sanborn et al., Aprendiendo sobre la marcha: La Compailia Minera Antamina
[Learning As They Go: Antamina Mining Company], in MOVIENDO MONTAAs: EMPRESAS,
COMUNIDADES Y ONG EN LAS INDUSTRIAS EXTRACIVAS [Moving Mountains: Corporations,
Communities and NGOs in Extractive Industries] 39-40 (2007).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Antamina, CONCENTRADOS DE ANTAMINA, Sept. 2007, at 2, available at
http://www.antamina.com/boletin/boletines/concentradosl5eng.pdf.
329. Id. at 30-31 (noting that, by 2006, Antamina had invested approximately U.S. $ 38
million in the community).
330. SANBORN ET AL., supra note 326, at 33.
331. COMPAMIA MINERA ANTAMINA S.A., CODE OF CONDUCT 11 (2006),
http://www.antamina.com/04-social/pdf/cod-conducta-eng.pdf.
332. Compaiiia Minera Antamina S.A., Social Responsibility,
http://www.antamina.com/04 social/En-index.html (last visited May 6, 2008).
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engaging with the community and the team responsible for their relocation
had inadequate staff and resources and no knowledge of the local
culture.333 Some maintain that, while Antamina adhered to the legal
requirements of its government license and World Bank financial
institutions, it did not adhere to the communities' customary conception of
law, including laws regarding land tenure.334 . According to both views,
"the breach between discourse and practice can be explained in great part
by the inexistence of an organizational culture committed to social
responsibility." 33
5
The consultation model used by Antamina, which was adopted in part
at the suggestion of the World Bank, also appears to be to blame for the
company's troubles.336 Community members were not satisfied with the
roundtables the company organized, because they did not see changes
being made to company plans, and they viewed the company's social
initiatives as symbolic compensation for the negative effects of mining,
instead of contributions to sustainable development.337 One mine official
viewed the company's inability to meet growing expectations as a "time
bomb" that led the company to focus on short-term measures to appease
the community at the expense of longer-term development strategies. 338 In
2001, conflict erupted when members of a fishing village, fearful of
contamination from a pipeline transporting minerals from the mine to the
Pacific Ocean, grew so frustrated about the project's impact on their
livelihood that they blockaded the port and detained two mine officials. 339
In the aftermath of the incident, the company began moving towards
the third-generation CSR model of community consent. It has adopted the
lexicon of "social capital," emphasizing the need to help affected
communities pursue a more symmetrical dialogue with the company 340
and an "open doors" policy to community concerns.341 The company has
invested over U.S. $ 60 million in its CSR effort and has been heralded as a
leader in CSR.342 Nevertheless, in 2005, the company's offices were
temporarily occupied by angry protesters.343 In April 2007, there were
regional strikes to protest the mine's activities and local mayors began
333. SANBORN ET AL., supra note 326, at 33, 51-54.
334. David Szablowski, Mining, Displacement and the World Bank, 39 J. Bus. ETHICS 247
(2002).
335. Sanborn et al., supra note 326, at 50.
336. Communities presented complaints to the World Bank in 1999 and 2000, which
resulted in the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) conducting on-site visits
and making a variety of recommendations to Antamina. See OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE
ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN (CAO), FINAL ASSESSMENT REPORT 9, (2006), available at
http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html.english/documents/
FinalAntaminaAssessmentMay06a.pdf (describing MIGA's study of the Antamina case).
337. SANBORN ET AL., supra note 326, at 51-54.
338. Id. at 57.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 63.
341. Id. at 65.
342. SANBORN ET AL., supra note 326, at 26.
343. Id. at 66-67.
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calling for an end to construction of the pipeline and for municipal
participation in environmental monitoring.344 Today the pressure is
growing on Antamina to deepen its CSR efforts and resolve remaining
problems with local communities. This pressure is intensified by the
discussions surrounding a Canada-Peru free trade agreement now before
the legislatures of both countries: the Canadian government is pointing to
one of Antamina's owners, Teck-Cominco, as an example of the socially
responsible way in which Canadian mining companies conduct themselves
in Peru.
345
4. Consent at Tintaya
The Tintaya copper mine, located in the Espinar province, produces
120,000 tons of copper per year, or about U.S. $ 1 billion-worth per year at
March 2008 prices.346 Between 1996 and 2006, the mine was owned by BHP
Billiton, the world's largest diversified mining company. 347 Even before
BHP Billiton took it over and operations began, local communities began
expressing a number of grievances against the mine, including that land
purchases and expropriations had not been conducted fairly, with
adequate compensation, or with their informed consent.348 Some
complained of violent forced evictions, others of losing their traditional
means of livelihood, and others about pollution and the lack of direct
benefit from the mines.349 Relations between the mine and the company
became so poor that, in 2000, CONACAMI asked Oxfam Community Aid
Abroad to address the Tintaya case with the head office of BHP Billiton,
prompting a field visit by the Australian Mining Ombudsman in 2001.350
Upon the recommendation of the Ombudsman, Tintaya instituted a
"mesa de didlogo" (roundtable) for professionally-led negotiations to take
place, and formed commissions to address community concerns.351 After
several years of negotiations, the process produced two agreements
between the company and local communities in September 2003 and
344. Marco Aquino, Peru Miners to Strike on Monday, REUTERS, Apr. 30, 2007, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2936874620070430?sp=true&view=sphere.
345. See Government of Canada, Canadian influenced mining: Turning profits into
promise - mining company raises the bar on corporate social responsibility in Peru,
http://geo.intemational.gc.ca/latin-america/peru/whats-new/default-en.aspx?id=11691.
346. Press Release, Xstrata Plc, Xstrata PLC Announces Acquisition of Tintaya Copper
Mine from BHP Billiton for U.S. $740 Million (May 16, 2006),
http://www.xstrata.com/media/news/2006/05/16/0701CET/news/200605161.en.pdf.
347. BHP Billiton Investors Shrug Off Tintaya Shutdown, REUTERS, May 26, 2005 [hereinafter
Investors shrug off Tintaya Shutdown]; OXFAM COMMUNITY AND ABROAD, MINING OMBUDSMAN
ANNUAL REPORT 32 (2003), https://www.trailwalker.com.au/campaigns/mining/docs/2003-
annual-report.pdf.
348. OXFAM, supra note 347, at 33.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. BHP Billiton, Tintaya Resolves to Restore Community Consultative Processes
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December 2004.352 In September 2003, Tintaya agreed to contribute three
percent of its annual pre-tax profits to sustainable development projects
and infrastructure in Espinar.353 In December 2004, it promised not to
undertake activities on land not already owned by the company without
the consent of its owners, to pay adequate compensation of all land it
acquired, to establish a development fund, and to involve the community
in environmental monitoring.
354
In May 2005, communities that had not been included in the earlier
agreements demanded that the company invest U.S. $ 20 million in
development projects in their communities as well.355 The protestors
occupied the mine, shutting it down for a month, forcing the evacuation of
company staff, causing significant damage by setting fires and looting, and
dispersing only when authorities intervened with tear gas.356 The protest
temporarily shut down the roundtable as well, while the company
questioned if those sitting at it were truly the community's chosen
representatives. 357 However, the roundtable resumed after a number of
NGOs and prominent individuals from various sectors of Peruvian society
supported it in a paid newspaper announcement entitled Dialogue Not
Violence - Agreements Not Impositions and the Ministry of Energy and Mines
formed a mediation commission to assist the process. 358 According to BHP
Billiton's study of the incident, "the indirect outcome was that the few
community leaders who had promoted the use of violence found their
public support base severely eroded."
35 9
The mine stoppage in 2005 did not have an appreciable impact on BHP
Billiton's profits, given that the mine represented only about one and a half
percent of the company's holdings, but it led copper industry analysts to
fear that the unrest could have ripple effects through the region.360 It also
prompted the company to redouble its efforts to implement the community
agreements, including by committing to use "a significant part [of the
development fund] to construct a new hospital in Espinar."361 According
to BHP Billiton, when it announced its intention to seek a buyer for Tintaya
in February 2006 (for reasons unrelated to the May 2005 event), it found
that "the value of the strong relationship between mine and communities
became even more apparent than it had been before. Potential buyers,




355. Investors Shrug Off Tintaya Shutdown, supra note 347.
356. BHP Billiton, supra note 351.
357. MARTIN SCURRAH, DEFENDIENDO DERECHOS Y PROMOVIENDO CAMBIOS 184-86 (2008).
358. Id. at 3.
359. BHP BILLITON, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2006 (2006), available at
http://hsecreport.bhpbilliton.com/2006/community/caseStudies/communityEngagement/t
intayaDialogueTable.asp.
360. Investors shrug off Tintaya Shutdown, supra note 347.
361. BHP BILLITON, supra note 359.
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2005 violence, were reassured when they heard first-hand from community
members about their relationship with Tintaya."
362
To reassure community leaders concerned that Tintaya might abandon
its participatory approach after the sale, BHP Billiton committed to
negotiating only with companies willing to "meet strict criteria of financial
strength and commitment to better practices in health, safety, environment
and community development." 363 When the Anglo-Swiss mining group
Xstrata plc bought Tintaya for U.S. $ 750 million in May 2006, it declared its
commitment to respect the agreements in place and to maintain the
dialogue processes. 364 By the end of 2006, Xstrata was reporting that it
expected to see Tintaya's production rise five percent during the
company's first full year operating the mine and noted the company's




The imperative to overcome the conflicts that characterize many
community-company relationships around the world today is becoming
more urgent for both sides. As the prices of extractive industry products
and the global demand for them hit all time highs, the risks of community
opposition to companies and the desire of communities to share in natural-
resource wealth are increasing. With easy to reach mineral deposits largely
exhausted, companies are expanding into more remote areas of the
developing world. Communities in these areas are becoming more vocal
and well organized, and have captured the attention of fund managers and
the financial press.
The Peruvian cases demonstrate that CSR has become part of the price
of operating an extractive industry project. They also show that the
business risks of imposing an extractive industry project on a community
without its consent are numerous and serious, and can threaten the success
of a project. Due to community opposition, Yanacocha (at Cerro Quilish
and Carachugo), Rio Blanco and Antamina's pipelines have experienced
construction delays. Indeed Yanacocha and Tintaya have suspended
operations periodically, and development of Cerro Quilish and Rio Blanco
is postponed indefinitely. Meanwhile, Manhattan Minerals and
362. Id.
363. BHP Billiton to Sell Copper Mine Tintaya, AGE (Austl.), Feb. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Business/BHP-Billiton-to-sell-copper-mine-
Tintaya/2006/02/09/139379597033.htm (quoting BHP BILLITON, supra note 359).
364. Press Release, Xstrata Plc, Xstrata Plc Announces Acquisition Of Tintaya Copper
Mine From BHP Billiton For U.S. $750 Million (May 16, 2006), available at
http://www.xstrata.com/media/news/2006/O5/16/0701CET.
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Monterrico Metals have abandoned or lost control of their respective
projects. Conversely, BHP Billiton reportedly received a good sales price
for Tintaya in part due to the good will the mine had engendered and
Xstrata reports that its production is up as it carries out sustainable
development agreements reached with the community.
The hostility of a community may affect a company and even the entire
extractive industry beyond the controversial project in question. The
controversy at Yanacocha helped spread anti-mining sentiment, making
the operating environment more difficult for all companies.
Documentaries about Yanacocha and Tambogrande damaged their
sponsors' reputations, while accusations regarding the Yanacocha mining
company's poor handling of community concerns complicated Newmont's
ability to win approval for projects in other communities and prompted
activist shareholders to force a change in the company's culture. On the
other hand, Teck-Cominco and BHP Billiton enjoyed public relations
boosts for their handling of community relations in Peru.
Community concerns often evolve over a project's long lifetime, so
consultation and consent processes must be informative, ongoing and
responsive. The controversies surrounding Cerro Quilish and
Tambogrande demonstrate that some projects may never obtain
community support, given the importance of certain sites to people's
identities, livelihoods and well-being, and that time and money can be
saved by finding this out before significant investments are made.
Meanwhile the conflicts at Antamina and Tintaya indicate that companies
should not assume that, once given, consent will not be revoked if new
concerns arise. The mercury spill at Yanacocha demonstrates that
communities have well-founded fears about environmental damage, while
communities' fears about the processes to be used at Rio Blanco -which in
a well-run mine may not be harmful-show the importance of
communication.
Addressing the primary triggers of opposition and consulting with
communities cannot fully mitigate the risks that social conflict presents to
businesses and to sustainable development. Antamina and Tintaya were
committed to second-generation CSR techniques and to consultations, but
these proved insufficient to avert outbreaks of conflict. Whereas
Antamina's experience shows that consultations must be part of consent
processes in which companies relinquish some measure of control over
decision-making, Tintaya's experience shows that durable agreements
cannot be reached unless companies and communities have the capacity to
engage in meaningful consultations. Tintaya's ongoing community
consent process highlights some of the many challenges facing the FPIC
model-how to determine who constitutes the relevant community, for
example-but also some of its many rewards. All of the Peruvian cases
suggest that conflict will ensue unless communities feel in control and see
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improvement in their lives as they watch companies and governments
extract profits from lands they have long occupied.
Finally, the cases indicate that host and home country governments can
play an important role in facilitating mutually beneficial outcomes for
business and society. In Peru, insufficient avenues for public participation
and inadequate regulation led to frustration and violence on the part of
communities. The government's failure to enforce its own laws requiring
community consent led communities near Tambogrande andi Rio Blanco to
take matters into their own hands and vote down projects that already had
state sanctioned licenses to operate. Yet tensions eased over the Rio Blanco
project once a congressional commission convened a dialogue between the
opposing sides and the Tintaya roundtable got back on track with support
from the Ministry of Energy and Mines. The Canadian government's
interest in Antamina rewards the mine for its efforts while making it less
likely that it will abandon the community development projects it has
initiated.
Given the costs of social conflict for both business and development,
consent processes offer a much needed risk mitigation strategy for
extractive industry companies and the communities they affect. The
Peruvian examples suggest that the companies that do a good job of
discerning and responding to community concerns will have more
successful projects, while the communities that have the capacity to
negotiate meaningfully with companies will be more likely to obtain
greater benefits from projects. Joint decision-making will also help
stakeholder relationships withstand the transitions between times of plenty
and hardship that characterize the extractive industries. In conclusion, the
companies and communities that seize this dangerous but propitious
moment in community-company relations by engaging in consent
processes stand to gain a competitive advantage over their competitors
while the communities that seize it stand to gain sustainable development
as a result of extractive industry projects.
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